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The ability to identify and authenticate entities in cyberspace such as users, computers, cell
phones, smart cards, and radio frequency identification (RFID) tags is usually accomplished
by having the entity demonstrate knowledge of a secret key. When the entity is portable
and physically accessible, like an RFID tag, it can be difficult to secure given the memory,
processing, and economic constraints. This work proposes to use unique patterns in the
transmitted signals caused by manufacturing differences to identify and authenticate a wire-
less device such as an RFID tag. Both manufacturer identification and tag identification
are performed on a population of 300 tags from three different manufacturers. A method-
ology to select features for identifying signals with high accuracy is developed and applied
to passive RFID tags. The classifier algorithms K-Nearest Neighbors, Parzen Windows, and
Support Vector Machines are investigated. The tag’s manufacturer can be identified with
99.93% true positive rate. An individual tag is identified with 99.8% accuracy, which is
better than previously published work. Using a Hidden Markov Model with framed timing
and power data, the tag manufacturer can be identified with 97.37% accuracy and has a
compact representation. An authentication system based on unique features of the signals
is proposed assuming that the readers that interrogate the tags may be compromised by a
malicious adversary. For RFID tags, a set of timing-only features can provide an accuracy
of 97.22%, which is better than previously published work, is easier to measure, and appears
to be more stable than power features.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber security refers to security as it applies to computers and networks. It refers to the
security of any entity that communicates. Two main processes are key to cyber security:
authentication and identification. Authentication is the process of confirming or denying
that a claimed identity is correct by comparing the credentials of user/object with those
previously proven, stored, and associated with the identity being claimed. On the other
hand, identification is the process of discovering the true identity of an item from the entire
collection of similar items, which requires a one-to-many matching.
Classic authentication and identification techniques depend on using a key or a password
to identify or authenticate a certain entity, which can be a user, a computer, a smart card,
etc. The entity will transmit its key whenever it is required to verify its identity. This
approach has many assumptions. First, the entity is assumed to be secure enough so that it
can hold the secret key without disclosing it to an unauthorized party. Second, the entity is
assumed to be capable of performing complex encryption and decryption operations based
on an available key. These encryption and decryption operations require the entity to have
a large memory, a power supply capable of supporting these complex operations, and a
computational unit capable of performing the encryption and decryption operations under
predefined timing constraints.
Some entities lack the previous capabilities including RFID, smart cards, wireless sensor
networks, etc. Therefore, researchers are looking for ways to authenticate and identify objects
other than relying on their capabilities to hold secrets. Authentication and identification
techniques are moving away from what an object “has” toward what an object “is”.
1
1.1 Motivation
We can identify a specific object based on what it “has”, which means that the object
must maintain a secret so that it can be accurately identified among a collection of similar
objects. The secret key can be duplicated which will allow an unauthorized access to physical
or logical resources. To prevent this threat, many systems are moving away from secret key
authentication. Instead they authenticate and identify objects based on what they “are”.
The same transition has already happened with human authentication, which relies on the
anatomical or behavioral characteristics [51] that makes us different from each other such
as fingerprints [62][15], Iris scans [20], voice recognition [44], face recognition [11], and palm
prints [32].
The motivation of this work is to build a fingerprint for objects based on their physical
characteristics so that they can be identified by what they “are”. As a representative of
the objects to identify and authenticate, we use passive ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio-
frequency identification (RFID) tags. RFID tags communicate with the world that surrounds
it using radio signals, which are easy to capture and inexpensive to analyze. RFID tags
are challenging to use because of their constrained resources. The proposed identification
technique for RFID described in this work can be applied to other objects with wireless
communication capabilities.
There are several challenges of identifying RFID tag signals. Tags need to be as inexpen-
sive as possible so that they can be used in mass scale [33] [60]. Retail stores need to have an
inexpensive tag so that the added tag’s overhead will not affect the price of the goods they
are selling. Passive UHF RFID tags have no power supply; it gathers its required energy by
harvesting the energy of the carrier waves sent by the RFID reader. RFID tags have little
memory and few processing capabilities, which makes adding any encryption technique to
the tag a hard, if not an impossible, task given the current power and cost limitations.
2
1.2 Objectives
The objectives of this work are listed below:
1. Create a methodology for identifying signals with high probability that is scalable and
can be deployed efficiently;
2. Investigate and evaluate a set of performance metrics;
3. Investigate classification and pattern recognition techniques for the purpose of identi-
fying both the tag manufacturer and individual tags;
4. Investigate hidden Markov model and compare the performance with the results ob-
tained using classical classification techniques; and
5. Create a system that identifies and authenticates RFID tags even with the presence of
malicious or hacked readers.
1.3 Background
In this section, background information for this work is presented. The background includes
information about RFID technology, its usage, and operations. In addition, the theory and
usage of a set of pattern recognition techniques are provided.
1.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a wireless technology that is used to identify objects.
There are three main parts of any RFID system, a reader, a server, and a tag. The reader
(or interrogator) sends commands to tags. The reader is also responsible for receiving the
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responses from the tags, demodulating, and decoding the tag’s transmission, and presenting
the tags response to the user in a way that will be easy to be understood. A low-power
RFID reader is shown in Figure 1.1. The second part of any RFID system is the server. The
server is responsible of collecting tag readings from the field via the reader(s), organizing
the collected reads, eliminating redundant reads if necessary, and presenting the data to the
system user in a concise and easy way to understand.
Figure 1.1: RFID Reader
RFID tags are responsible for receiving the commands from the reader, decoding them,
and responding with the appropriate data. An example of an RFID tag is shown in Figure 1.2.
Each RFID tag is composed of several components such as an antenna, a power supply, a
memory chip, and a microprocessor chip [43]. An example of an RFID system is provided
in Figure 1.3.
4
Figure 1.2: RFID Tag
RFID tags are classified based on their power source into three categories: active, semi-
active, and passive tags. Active RFID tags have a battery onboard, which means that they
can communicate over longer distances than other types and they are capable of performing
more complex operations. On the other hand, having a battery means that the tags will
consume more space and that they will be more expensive. Semi-passive tags have a battery
onboard but it is only used for running the onboard logical chip and sensors, not for com-
munication purposes, which means that the battery lasts longer than active tags [30][16].
The last category of RFID tags based on their power supply is called passive tags. Passive
RFID tags do not have a power supply onboard but they rely on the energy contained in the
reader’s carrier-wave. The process in which the passive tag gets its energy is called energy
harvesting [29]. Because passive tags do not have a dedicated power supply, they are small
in size and inexpensive. Therefore, they are widely used in many applications such as animal
tracking, inventory control, and access control.
RFID tags can be also categorized based on the frequency bands they are using. Several
frequency bands can be used in RFID communication including low-frequency (LF), high-
frequency (HF), and ultra-high-frequency (UHF). The focus of this work is on passive UHF
RFID tags that operate between 860 MHz and 960 MHz.
In order to control the communication data stream between the reader and the tag, a
5
Figure 1.3: RFID System
standard was introduced. EPCglobal is a non-profit organization that developed a standard
called EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2) [1], which “defines the physical and logical require-
ments for a passive-backscatter, interrogator-talks-first (ITF), radio-frequency identification
(RFID) system operating in the 860 MHz - 960 MHz frequency range”. In EPCglobal C1G2,
the reader and the tag take turns in communicating with each other as shown in Figure 1.4.
The reader will select an individual tag to query based on an anti-collision protocol [14][67]
that is similar to the slotted Aloha wireless protocol [3][5]. Once a tag is selected, it sends its
handle (a 16-bit random number (RN16)) to the reader. This handle is used by the reader
for any future communication with the tag.
Because RFID technology does not need line-of-sight to operate alongside its inexpensive
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Figure 1.4: EPC Class-1 Gen-2
price, made it a perfect candidate for many inventory and supply chain applications. RFID
technology is currently being used by large companies such as Walmart [12] to keep track
of inventory and is included in some goods in its retail stores. RFID is also being used in
many applications other than inventory control, such as:
 Contactless payment systems;
 Access control;
 Tracking assets in hospitals;
 Animal tracking and monitoring;
 Building management;
 Library services;
 Municipal solid waste management; and
 Enterprize feedback control.
1.3.2 Classification
Classification refers to a set of methods from which an object is mapped to a cluster of
similar objects. Classification is used to solve problems such as robotic vision, fingerprint
matching, voice recognition, and medical decision making. Classification techniques work
by creating a rule based on previously known objects. This rule is often called classifier.
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Classification techniques can be divided into two main groups, rule-based and learning-
based [69]. Rule-based classifiers determine their final decision by comparing an overall
similarity score and a threshold value. Rule-based classifiers are good for capturing domain
knowledge and are applicable to many scenarios. Decision tree classifiers such as [52] [64]
[57] are categorized under rule-based classifiers. On the other hand, learning-based classifiers
depend on statistically creating the decision rule(s) based on the sample data. Users of the
learning-based approach need to explicitly provide classifier examples rather than just rules.
Support vector machines [18], k nearest neighbors (k-NN) [21], and Parzen windows [45] are
techniques that use the learning-based approach.
1.3.2.1 K Nearest Neighbors
K nearest neighbors (k-NN) is a non-probabilistic, non-parametric classification method that
classifies an unlabeled test sample based on its similarity with samples in the training set
[61][21]. k-NN is among the simplest of all classification and machine learning algorithms.
There are three main components that are needed so that k-NN can work correctly.
First, k-NN requires an integer k that represents how many close neighbors the algorithm
should use to formulate its final decision. Second, k-NN requires a distance metric that
measures the difference in a test sample and training sample. Finally, k-NN requires a set
of training samples. Several distance metrics can be used in k-NN such as the Euclidian
distance, Manhattan distance, and Hamming distance.
k-NN makes several assumptions. It assumes that the training and testing data is already
in the feature space. It assumes that each of the training samples consists of a feature vector
and a class label associated with it. In the simplest case, this class label can be either positive
or negative (binary classifier), but k-NN also works with multiple class labels (multi-class
classifier).
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The most common k value in k-NN is 1. When 1 is used as k, the classifier is often
called 1−NN . What 1−NN means is that we need to find the closest training instance to
the test sample. Other common values are 3 and 5. If the value of k was even, then a draw
between two or more class labels may occur. In order to prevent that possible draw, weights
are added to the final decision of k-NN as shown in Equation 1.1, where d1 is the distance
to the closest training sample, dk is the distance to the k
th closest training sample, and dj
is the distance to the jth closest training sample. The closest training sample will have the





, dk 6= d1
1, dk = d1
(1.1)
k-NN is a simple approach that is easy to understand and use. The main drawback of
using k-NN is that it needs to compute the distance between the test sample and all of the
training samples and then select the closest k training samples to formulate its decision.
Having all training samples is the main challenge. If the number of training samples is
moderate, then k-NN will have a fast computation time and it will not require a large
memory, but it will have a larger error rate. On the other hand, if we use a large training
data set, the decision error will be minimal but the time and memory requirement will grow
large, which makes k-NN unusable for a large number of online and offline applications.
1.3.2.2 Parzen Windows
Parzen windows is a technique that was invented by Emanuel Parzen [45] [6]. The goal of
Parzen windows is to estimate the probability density function (PDF) from the training data-
set. The reason behind using the term window in the process name is due to the argument
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that “if we want to estimate the value of PDF at observation x, we can place a window
function at x and determine how many training observations fall within the window, or
rather, what the contribution of each training observation to the window” [6]. The final score
of the Parzen classifier is the sum total of the contributions from the training observations
to the window. The Parzen window estimation formula is shown in Equations 1.2, where n
is the number of training observations, h is the smoothing parameter, Xi is the i
th training






























There are several choices for kernel functions. Gaussian, uniform, triangular, biweight,
and Epanechnikov are among the popular kernel functions. Equation 1.3 shows an example
of a Parzen windows estimator when Gaussian is being used as a kernel function. Trial-and-
error are the best way to determine the best kernel function to use since it differs based on the
problem. Other than the choice of the kernel function, the choice of the smoothing parameter
h (window width) is very important. Parzen windows evolved from histograms, in which the
smoothing parameter is used to determine the width of the bins. If h is selected to be large,
it will over-smooth the result, which means that some of the data will be hidden. On the
other hand, using a small value for h will under-smooth the results, which means that any
noise in the data will have an effect on the end classification result. The previous argument
demonstrates the importance of selecting the appropriate value of h since it directly affects
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the end result.
1.3.2.3 Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines (SVM) [59][18][13] is a classification technique introduced by Vapnik
in 1995. The main idea behind SVM is that it maps the input vectors into some high
dimensional feature space Z through some non-linear mapping chosen a priori. In this space,
a linear decision surface (hyperplane) is constructed with special properties that ensure high
generalization ability of the network. Given a training set of N data points {yk, xk}Nk=1,
where xk ∈ Rn is the kth data training sample, yk ∈ R is the kth output class label, the SVM
formula has a form similar to that which is shown in Equation 1.4, where αk is a positive



























αkykΨ(x, xk) + b
]
(1.4)
Using Equation 1.4, SVM generates a set of hyperplanes that separates the training
set based on its labels. The main problem that SVM tries to solve is finding an optimal
distance between the hyperplane and every other class. This distance is called margins and
the problem SVM tries to solve is called margin maximization.
1.3.3 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov model (HMM) [54] is a technique that is used for pattern recognition. In
HMM if there exist i number of classes to classify the test sample into, then i models must
11















Figure 1.5: Hidden Markov Model Parameters
In order to use HMM efficiently, the system to be modeled must have its output quantized
into an observation stream. Observations can be anything that results from the system when
it runs. Observations can be the result of a series of coin tosses (head or tails); it can be the
result of throwing a rolling dice for several times (1-6); it can be a voltage-time waveform
that results from processing some speech patterns, etc.
As Figure 1.5 shows, any HMM is built using a set of probabilities, a set of states,
and a set of observations. The states are the engine that runs the model. Each state will
generate a possible observation. The model keeps running until the appropriate number of
observations are generated. Once the observations are generated, the resultant observation
stream is compared with the test sample stream to determine if they are close. There are 5
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elements for any HMM:
1. N , the number of states in the model. In general, the states are interconnected in a
way that allows any state to reach any other state;
2. M , the number of distinct observation symbols per state;




, where aji is the probability that
the current state is i and the next state for the system to be in is j;
4. The observation symbol probability distribution in state j, B = {bj (k)}, where bj (k)
is the probability that the kth observation will appear at state j; and
5. The initial state distribution π = {πi}, where πi is the probability that the model will
initially start at state i.
To apply HMM, three main problems are solved:
1. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2O3...OT , and a model λ = P (O|λ), what is
the probability that the observation sequence was generated using the model?;
2. Given the observation sequence O = O1O2O3...OT , and a model λ, how to select a
corresponding state sequence Q = q1q2q3...qT , which best explains the observation
sequence?; and
3. How to adjust the model parameters λ = (A,B, π) to maximize P (O|λ)?
For more information regarding the mathematical models that are responsible for solving
the previous problems please refer to [54][7][63].
One of the issues that arises when using HMM is how to initialize all of the model
parameters. To solve this problem, researchers often initialize the model parameters using
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a uniform distribution. All the probabilities will be equivalent to each other while some
rules hold in both the initialization and optimization steps. The first rule that needs to
hold true is that the sum of probabilities for the model moving to any state j from state






. The second rule that must hold true is that the sum of
initial probability π must be equal to 1
(∑N
i=1 πi = 1
)
. Finally, the summation of the all




, where T is the
number of distinct observations that can be generated at state i.
To classify a new observation sequence, a HMM for each of the possible classes is gen-
erated λ1λ2...λl, where l is the number of classes (patterns). Each of the available models
describes only one of the classes. When we evaluate the new observation sequences O,
P (O|λ1)P (O|λ2)P (O|λ3)...P (O|λl) must be computed. The model with the maximum prob-
ability i assumed to be the one that can generate the observation sequence O and thus O
belongs to that model.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, related work in the area of
identifying and authenticating RFID tags is presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the
feature extraction, feature selection, and the classification experiments are presented. The
work on hidden Markov models is provided in Chapter 4. Signals authentication using the
fingerprints is presented in Chapter 5. Finally, the conclusions and the planned future work




Fingerprinting is the process of creating a unique identifier that can be used to accurately
identify and/or authenticate an object. The fingerprinting process can be applied to any
object as long as the result can uniquely identify that object. For example, researchers
introduced the idea of fingerprinting an official paper (or any paper) by measuring the three
dimensional paper’s surface using commodity scanners, and without modifying the document
in any way [17]. The authors of [17] demonstrated that it is possible to generate a fingerprint
of a document using a flatbed scanner coupled with the appropriate software. The proposed
system can be used like a digital signature to authenticate official and important documents.
Bluetooth networks can also have a fingerprint. In [26], an intrusion detection system
that uses radio frequency fingerprints (RFF) for profiling, Hotelling’s T 2 for classification,
and a decision filter is introduced. The transient portion of the exchanged signal is used to
identify a bluetooth transceiver. The reason behind using the transient response is because it
depends on the hardware of the transceiver, which makes it hard to replicate. Features such
as frequency, amplitude, and phase are extracted. For each transceiver, multiple fingerprints
are created and the outliers are removed. K-means clustering technique of [39] can be used
to select a representative set of the enrolled fingerprints. One of the issues this work had
to deal with is the presence of noise and interference, which may lead to errors in the final
decision making process. To work around the errors, a set of fingerprints are independently
classified and a decision filter is applied to determine the final decision based on multiple
observed fingerprints.
Additional work that aims to enhance bluetooth security through fingerprints is pre-
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sented in [46]. The purpose is to allow bluetooth devices manufacturers to implement a user
friendly, and efficient intrusion detection and prevention systems. The radio frequency (RF)
fingerprint depends on the transient phase of the bluetooth transceiver signal, which lasts an
interval between 2 - 10 ms. The proposed system is a local system that is designed to work
within a single company in a single building that includes a bluetooth enabled server at a
fixed location. The server has the role of saving all the fingerprints of the legitimize blue-
tooth devices. Bluetooth devices have the option of not using the system; but if they want
to use the system, all communication must go through the server. The system is efficient
since it requires small physical size (the server), all intensive operations are taking place at
the server, and no modifications are required on the bluetooth devices.
Another form of fingerprinting physical devices is presented in [34]. In this work, ethernet
cards are fingerprinted by exploiting small deviations in the card’s hardware that appear as
differences in the clock skews. The technique does not require any modification of the card’s
hardware, and can be employed without the knowledge and/or cooperation of the card itself.
TCP timestamps, periodic activities, or ICMP timestamps are used to measure the clock
skew. Fourier transform is used to extract the time skew, which is independent of the
distance, access technology, and topology. The system was demonstrated to work well over
international networks.
Cellular networks use RF fingerprinting to prevent fraud. According to [55], Corsair
communications provides an RF fingerprinting system for cellular networks. RF characteris-
tics are extracted and used as fingerprints. Also, TRW Inc. had developed a similar system
that is used by the military to track enemies radio signals by recognizing these fingerprints.
In the rest of this chapter, related work on identifying and/or authenticating RFID
tags is presented. RFID technology is different than the previously discussed technologies
(Bluetooth, cellular networks, etc.). From here on we will focus on passive RFID tags that are
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characterized by having very constrained resources such as power, computation, and memory.
Having constrained resources makes the identification and authentication problems harder
than systems with high-end resources. For example, having limited resources such as memory
and power makes it hard to implement security measures to assist with the identification
and authentication process.
2.1 Identifying RFID tags using minimum power response
In [49] and [48], the authors present a way to fingerprint passive UHF RFID tags based
on their minimum power response measured at multiple frequencies. The minimum power
response was measured using a Voyantic Tagformance Lite system [38] in an anechoic cham-
ber, which was designed for best tag placement on objects. Using an anechoic chamber
means that all the experiments are conducted in a controlled RF environment. Before each
experiment, the system is calibrated using a calibration tag.
To measure the minimum power response, they use a bottom-up algorithm that sends
signals to the tag. The power of the sent signals starts at -20 dBm and keeps incrementing by
0.01 dBm until the tag responds. When the tag response is detected, the power of the signal
at that instant is recorded and is considered to be the minimum power response. Frequencies
that range from 860 MHz to 960 MHz are tested on 100 passive RFID tags. Each of the
tags is measured 6 times. Two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) [24] is applied on the
gathered data. It shows that both the frequency and the particular tag significantly affect
the minimum power response. The authors use the k-NN classifier based on the minimum
power response. They are able to classify the tags with an average true positive rate (TPR)
of 90.5% for two manufacturers.
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2.2 Identifying RFID tags using certificate of authority
Fingerprinting RFID tags by adding a random scattering structure to the tag is introduced in
[35]. These structures consist of a difficult to replicate, random arrangement of a conductive
material, such as copper wire, mixed with a firm dielectric material, such as plastic PET
mold, that produces a unique and repeatable response. The additional structure renders
RFID tags physically unique and is hard to replicate. The authors measure the near-field
response of the added structure when creating the fingerprint. The distance between the
reader’s antenna and the tag has to be very close, between 1mm and 8mm. A misalignment
noise in the readings exists because of mounting issues. In order to verify that the fingerprint
acquired works, a binary classification problem is assumed.
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) [53] is used to estimate the underlying distribution
of the fingerprints. The results of the classification show that the probability to confuse a
fake tag with a real one is less than 10−200 if the same copper-based structure is used and
that probability will be reduced to 10−300 considering all fingerprints. The disadvantage of
this work is that the distance between the reader antenna and tag has to be very close when
measuring unlike in our work.
2.3 Identifying RFID tags using power and timing features
In [68], timing and power features extracted from UHF RFID tag for identification purposes
is discussed. A population of 70 tags from three different manufacturers is used. A special-
built RFID reader is used to challenge the tags by initiating an inventory process. RF
features, such as power and timing, are extracted by measuring the tag’s (RN16) preamble
sent by the reader as part of the tag’s reply to the inventory command.
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The main goal of the work in [68] is to study the feasibility and the accuracy of physical-
layer identification and classification of passive UHF RFID tags. The experimental setup
consists of a special purpose tag reader for signal acquisition, and a feature extracting and
matching module. Between the performed experiments, the tag is powered down and is
assumed to have lost all of its stored energy before being activated again for the next exper-
iment.
The first experiment that is conducted is the extraction of the time interval error (TIE)
feature. The TIE measures how far each active edge of the clock varies from its ideal position.
As time goes by, a constant increase in the TIE (δTIE) was observed. This (δTIE) value has
been considered as the timing feature to be used for identification and classification. Power




of the acquired RN16 is
calculated. PB relates the backscatter power transferred from the tag to the reader during
data modulation phase. The results of the classification experiments demonstrate that the
TIE has an accuracy of 71.4% while the average baseband power has an accuracy of 43.2%.
The experiments also demonstrate that combining the time and power features results in a
98.7% accuracy. In addition, it shows that the timing results are stable but the power results
are not stable across different configurations. Finally, the spectral feature method from [19]
is applied to UHF tags in [68] resulting in an accuracy of 99.6% but the results are not stable
at varying distances.
2.4 RFID tag counterfeit detection using timing features from transient re-
sponses
Work on fingerprinting HF RFID tags is presented in [56]. Since HF RFID tags are used,
inductive coupling, rather than radiation or backscattering, is the primary electromagnetic
transmission mechanism. A closed loop test system is used to test the RFID tags. In the test
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setup, a computer and a commercial RFID reader provide the digital commands necessary
to advance a reader-tag transaction. The computer initiates the transaction via the reader,
and it keeps on recording the electromagnetic field measurement of that transaction.
The authors extract timing features from the transient response of the tag as well as
frequency and phase components. The techniques are tested on a set of 20 RFID smart
cards. There are zero classification errors in their small sample size. The features in [56]
are measured in the HF frequency band and in the near field unlike our measurements that
are from the UHF frequency band and in the far field. Therefore, the distance between the
reader antenna and tag is necessarily smaller than the distances in our measurement.
2.5 Physical unclonable functions
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [58] are innovative circuit primitives that extract se-
crets from the physical characteristics of integrated circuits rather than storing them in a
digital memory. PUF is a way to fingerprint IC chips by generating volatile secret keys for
cryptographic operations. These volatile secret keys can only be attacked when the chip is
powered on, which makes attacking the volatile memory to discover the secret key a much
harder problem than attacking a non-volatile memory that stores secret keys.
PUFs are functions that are embedded within the chips to be authenticated. PUF maps
a set of challenges to a set of responses based on an intractably complex physical system.
The function can only be evaluated with the physical system, and is unique for each physical
instance.
To authenticate an RFID tag using PUFs, the tag must go through and enrollment phase
in which a trusted party applies a set of challenges to the PUF and records the response,
which can be either stored at a database (off-line authentication) or directly on the tag (on-
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line authentication) as seen in Figure 2.1. During verification, a random challenge (from the
set of challenges that the tag was subjected to at enrollment phase) is sent to the tag. The
tag’s response is recorded and compared with the one that was previously stored (from the
enrollment phase). If the tag’s response matches the one that was previously recorded, then
the tag is assumed to be authentic.
Figure 2.1: PUF Authentication System. The flowchart on the left presents the enrollment




In this section, the set of experiments that are conducted for RFID tag identification is
discussed. We start by describing the setup used for the experiments. An overview of the
testing environment and the methodology is provided. The extracted features and the steps
that have been taken to finalize the feature set are presented. We conclude this section by
providing the final classification results for identification of the tag manufacturer and for
individual tag identification.
3.1 Testing Environment
All the measurements are performed using a specialized RFID conformance test system,
which is shown in Figure 3.1 [2]. This programmable conformance test system is capable of
sending valid and invalid commands to test how will the tags respond. The conformance test
system is capable of capturing the response from the tags, processing these responses, and
extracting important features for fingerprinting. An example of the captured transmission
is shown in Figure 3.2. The conformance test system includes a 2.7 GHz RF up-converter,
a 2.7 GHz RF down-converter, and an FPGA based IF transceiver.
In order to mimic real world environment, no special precautions are taken when mea-
suring the tags. In other words, the measurements are taken in a noisy environment, where
thermal fluctuations occur, cell-phone noise is available, WiFi noise is present, and RF noise
occurs in a random fashion. The only restriction we apply while measuring the tags is the
distance between the reader antenna and the tag to be tested. In all the experiments, the
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Figure 3.1: Conformance Test System
distance between the reader antenna and the tag is fixed. Tags from three different man-
ufacturers are being tested. For each manufacturer, 100 tags are measured. Each tag was
measured for 5 times. A total of 1500 overall measurements are gathered. After each of the
measurements, the tags are assumed to have lost all of the energy it stored in the previous
measurement.
3.2 Feature Descriptors
Each RFID tag is characterized by a set of features. These features are used by the classi-
fier’s algorithm to determine if the presented tag features match the enrolled tag features.
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Figure 3.2: RFID tag sample transmission
Therefore, the chosen features will be the main factor in determining the performance of the
classifier. Adding more features does not necessarily improve the performance of the classi-
fier. In fact, adding more features can increase the noise in the data. Therefore, choosing
features is usually a two-step process, that is, feature extraction and feature selection.
In the proposed methodology, regular commands are sent to the RFID tags by the
conformance test system, which acts as a specialized reader, and the response from the tags
is measured and recorded. The reader demodulates the received transmission and extracts
the features, which include timing, voltage, and power measurements. Several high-level
observations have been discovered:
1. For each of the tested tag manufacturers, some tags have large variance in the time
needed to send data to the reader. For example, the tags from Manufacturers A and
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B alternate between two different timing delays;
2. Tags from the same manufacturer tend to have the same transmission time range; and
3. There are differences in features among tags, especially in timing and power measure-
ments.
Given the previous observations, we hypothesized that we could distinguish tags by their
measured features if we determined good combinations of these features. In other words,
if we are given enough features and enough training data we will be able to identify the
manufacturer and/or the individual tag identity of the tag that is being tested.
3.3 Feature Extraction
Using the custom built reader’s software, we can focus our attention on any part of the tag’s
response. We choose to focus on the tag’s transmission of the PC+EPC+CRC as Figure
3.2 shows a sample for that transmission. The reason for selecting the PC+EPC+CRC is
because it can be repeated as many times as possible and it is a long transmission. This
gives the extracted features the highest possibility to be distinct among different tags. Long
transmissions have higher probability of exhibiting distinct patterns than short transmissions.
The data analysis software we use generates most of the features we needed such as,
power, and timing features. Other features, such as actual time-voltage waveform, can not
be generated from the software as is. In order to record actual time-voltage waveform,
we modified the software. The performed modification are shown in Figure 3.3 where we
added recording hooks to record when the PC+EPC+CRC starts and stops. The second
modification we did is shown in Figure 3.4 where we added a recording hook to record the
entire reader-tag communication session.
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Figure 3.3: LabView modification to record timing
The extracted features can be categorized into three groups.
 Power features: These features represent the power measurement that are acquired
from the PC+EPC+CRC transmission;
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Figure 3.4: LabView modification to record time-voltage waveform
 Timing Features: These features represent how long will it take the tag to perform
a certain operation; and
 Voltage Features: These features represent information that is gathered from the
tag’s response time-voltage waveform of the demodulated signal.
A total of 14 features are acquired. The following is a list of these features with a short
description of each. In the rest of this dissertation, we will refer to the features by their
number in the list.
1. PC+EPC+CRC Transmission time: It is measured from the demodulated wave-
form. This is the time it takes for the tag to transmit its protocol-control information
(PC), EPC, and cyclic-redundancy check (CRC), after it is queried by a reader and
is measured in microseconds. The PC+EPC+CRC sequence is the most common se-
27
quence that a tag responds with when identifying itself. Typical measurements are
500-575 microseconds;
2. PC+EPC+CRC Amplitude: It is measured from the demodulated waveform. This
is the equivalent DC component of the PC+EPC+CRC transmission and is measured
in Vrms. Typical measurements were 3.278 millivolts RMS (mV rms);
3. PC+EPC+CRC Power: It is measured from the demodulated waveform. This
is the received power of PC+EPC+CRC that is transmitted by the tag and is mea-
sured in dBm 50, which means dBm at 50 ohm impedance. It is derived from the
PC+EPC+CRC Amplitude. Typical measurements are −43 dBm 50;
4. First Random Number T1: It is measured from the demodulated waveform. This
is the time delay from the end of the Query command by the reader to the beginning
of the 16-bit random number transmitted by the tag and is measured in microseconds.
Typical measurements are 35-40 microseconds. T1 refers to the time the tag needs to
recharge after it responds to the reader;
5. PC+EPC+CRC T1: It is measured from the demodulated waveform. This is
the time delay from the end of the ACK by the reader to the beginning of the
PC+EPC+CRC transmitted by the tag and is measured in microseconds. Typical
measurements are 35-40 microseconds;
6. Second Random Number T1: It is measured from the demodulated waveform.
This is the time delay from the end of the request from the reader for a new handle
after it receives the PC+EPC+CRC to the beginning of the new 16-bit random number
transmitted by the tag and is measured in microseconds. Note that the conformance
test system is programmed to ask for another handle from the tag after it receives the
PC+EPC+CRC. Typical measurements are 35-40 microseconds;
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7. Power in Channel: It is measured from the frequency spectrum. This is the power
received by the reader from the tag in an RF channel while the tag is transmitting the
PC+EPC+CRC and is measured in dBm. It is the power in the 500 KHz channel at
which we take the measurements. We fix the frequency to be 915 MHz. Therefore,
the channel is 915 MHz +/- 250 KHz, or 500 KHz wide. A typical measurement is
−508.7m dBm or −0.5087 dBm;
8. Power in Upper: It is measured from the frequency spectrum. This is the power
received by the reader from the tag in the channel above the measured RF channel
while the tag is transmitting the PC+EPC+CRC and is measured in dBm. We take
measurements in the 500 KHz channel that has a center frequency of 915 MHz. There-
fore, the Power in the Upper is the power in the channel with a center frequency of
915 MHz + 0.5 MHz. A typical measurement is −40 dBm;
9. Power in Lower: It is measured from the frequency spectrum. This is the power
received by the reader from the tag in the channel below the measured RF channel
while the tag is transmitting the PC+EPC+CRC and is measured in dBm. We take
measurements in the 500 KHz channel that has a center frequency of 915 MHz. There-
fore, the Power in the Lower is the power in the channel with a center frequency of 915
MHz - 0.5 MHz. A typical measurement is −40 dBm;
10. Power Received: This is the power received by the reader from the tag at the base
frequency of 915 MHz +/- 1.5 MHz, a 3 MHz channel, and is measured in dBm.
In other words, this is the total power received in a 3 MHz channel with the reader
frequency centered in the channel. For example, we measure −0.476 dBm from 915-1.5
MHz to 915+1.5 MHz, which is larger than the Power in Channel feature;
11. Voltage Maximum in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data: This is the maxi-
mum voltage received by the reader from the tag and is measured in volts;
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12. Voltage Minimum in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data: This is the minimum
voltage received by the reader from the tag and is measured in volts;
13. Voltage Variance in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data: This is the variance
of the voltage received by the reader from the tag and is measured in volts squared;
and
14. Voltage Standard Deviation in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data: This
is the standard deviation of the voltage received by the reader from the tag and is
measured in volts.
3.4 Feature Selection
Features selection refers to the process in which a subset of the available features will be
used in classification experiments. One might wonder why the need for feature selection? If
we used all the available features, will it not be better than using a subset of features?
Many issues might arise from using all of the features. First, using all the features will
require using large memory to store each of the object’s feature descriptor array. Processing
all the features requires substantial computation and processing capabilities, which in turn
requires longer time to compute. Finally and most importantly, having all features available
does not necessarily result in the best performance. The previous phenomenon is known as
the “curse of dimensionality” [28].
For the previous reasons, we can reduce the number of features [36] using many techniques
such as principal component analysis (PCA) [66], and linear discriminant analysis (LDA)
[23][40]. In our work, we started by testing all the feature as shown in Section 3.4.1 to
determine which of the features contributes greatly in discriminating between tags and which
features do not. After that, we tested the correlation between the different features to
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eliminate the ones that are closely related as shown in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Preliminary Classification
In order to have an initial idea on which of the features affects the classification results, some
preliminary classification is performed. With preliminary classification we train and test the
k-NN (k = 1, 3, and 5), Parzen windows, and SVM classifiers on the features. We train the
classifiers using 66% of the available data and we test the classifiers performance using the
remaining 34% of the data. The previous balance between the training and testing data is
referred to as 66/34.






manufacturer and tag identification problems. Therefore, there are four sets of experiments.
In the manufacturer identification problem, when presented with a tag, we classify it as
belonging to one of the three enrolled manufacturers, A, B, or C. In addition, we have three
sets of experiments for the tag identification problem, one for each of the three manufacturers.
In the tag identification problem, when presented with a tag from a particular manufacturer
we classify it as belonging to a particular enrolled tag. We decided that performing the
tag identification problem within a set of tags from one manufacturer is a more difficult, or
worst-case, test of tag identification.
For each classifier in each of the four sets of experiments, we calculate the true positive
rate (TPR) and we identify the top-ten set of features based on this rate. The TPR is
defined in terms of the number of true positives (TP ) and the number of false negatives
(FN), TPR = TP
TP+FN
. All of the performance evaluation terms will be described in depth
in Section 3.6.1.
For both manufacturer and tag identification problems, 1-NN, 3-NN, 5-NN, and Parzen
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Window have reasonable TPRs. However, SVM does not perform as well for either manufac-
turer or tag identification problems. In the tag identification problem, SVM performs poorly
with less than 50% TPR and is computationally intensive. The manufacturer identification
problem appears to be easier for all classifiers with many of the classifiers identifying the
correct manufacturer without making any classification error. The tag identification prob-
lem for the three manufacturers is more difficult but for certain sets of features the TPR is
above 77% and for some classifiers above 95%. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the top-ten set of
features for tag identification of manufacturer A, when classifying with the 1-NN and Parzen
Window classifiers, respectively. Note that adding more features does not necessarily result
in better performance (curse of dimensionality), and none of the sets have all 14 features.
This gives us evidence that we can reduce the number of features without compromising the
classifier’s performance. The 1-NN classifier performs best in all four sets of experiments so
it is chosen for determining the final feature set.
Table 3.1: 1-NN Top-Ten Results for Tag Identification of Manufacturer A
True positive rate Features responsible
99% 1 2 7 8 11 12 13 14
98% 1 2 7 9 10 12 14
97% 1 3 6 7 8 9 13 14
97% 1 3 6 7 8 9 12
97% 1 3 6 7 8 9 10 14
97% 1 3 4 6 7 8 10 12 13
97% 1 2 7 9 10 11 12
97% 1 2 7 8 10 11 12 14
97% 1 2 7 8 9 10 12 13
97% 1 2 5 7 8 10 12 14
3.4.2 Features’ Histogram
After gathering the top-ten results for each of the classifiers (k-NN, Parzen windows, and
SVM) we noticed that 1-NN had the best performance. Since 1-NN had the best performance,
we used its results for tag identification problems to determine how many times each of the
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Table 3.2: Parzen Window Top-Ten Results for Tag Identification of Manufacturer A
True positive rate Features responsible
81% 2 7 9 10 11 12
80% 3 7 8 9 10 14
80% 2 7 9 12
79% 2 7 8 12 13 14
79% 2 7 8 11 14
79% 2 7 8 9 13
79% 2 7 8 9 10 12
78% 3 7 8 9 10 12 14
78% 2 7 8 10 11
77% 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 12
features appear in a set that had high TPR. To determine the number of times a certain
feature appear in the top-ten results, a histogram is used.
Histograms are a graphical representation showing visual impression of the data distri-
bution [47]. Histograms are used to plot the density of the data and often used for density
estimation, which is another name for Parzen windows classifier. The mathematical foun-
dation of any histogram can be summarized as shown in Equation 3.1 where, n is the total





Figure 3.5 shows the histogram of the number of times that a feature appears in the top-
ten set of results for manufacturer identification, tag identification for manufacturer A, tag
identification for manufacturer B, and tag identification for manufacturer C. The histogram
shows a strong overlap of features that are good for identifying both the manufacturer and
the individual tag. Even though there are slight differences, we decided that having the























































Figure 3.5: Histogram of the Number of Times a Feature Appears in Good Sets Based on the




The main goal behind applying correlation on the available features set is to determine the
dependencies among the features, thus, eliminating any redundant feature. Correlation is
a measure of how much two variable are related. After applying the correlation analysis
on a set of variable (features) n, a correlation matrix n × n is generated. The values in
the correlation matrix range between +1 and -1. A value of +1 in the correlation matrix
means that there is a perfect positive correlation (if one variable increases, the other one
will increase by the same ratio as well) between the two variables, which are represented by
the row and column numbers. A value of -1 in the correlation matrix means that there is
a perfect negative correlation (if one variable increases, the other variable will decrease by
the same ration as well) between the two variables, which are represented by the row and
column numbers.





To build a correlation matrix, we first calculate the covariance matrix and use its elements
for the correlation calculations. Equation 3.2 is usually used to calculate the covariance of
two elements i and j. In Equation 3.2, Xi refers to element i and µi refers to the mean of
element i over all readings. The correlation matrix is then built using Equation 3.3. After
applying the correlation analysis on the feature set we have, several dependencies appeared
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Table 3.3: Correlation Analysis
Features Correlation Score
Feature #2 and Feature #3 0.9946
Feature #4, Feature #5, and Feature #6 0.859 - 0.875
Feature #7 and Feature #10 0.9944
Feature #11 and Feature #12 0.9978
Feature #13 and Feature #14 0.9955
Feature #8 and Feature #9 0.9696
as shown in Table 3.3.
By looking at Table 3.3, we notice the following
1. The correlations between the First Random Number T1 (feature #4), the PC+EPC+
CRC T1 (feature #5), and the Second Random Number T1 (feature #6) are between
0.859 to 0.875 because it is dependant on the power supply unit of the tag;
2. There is a high correlation between the PC+EPC+CRC power (feature #3), and the
amplitude of PC+EPC+CRC (feature #2). The reason behind such high correlation
is because the power is actually derived from the amplitude; and
3. There is a high correlation between the voltage variance in PC+EPC+CRC transmit-
ted data (feature #13), and voltage standard deviation in PC+EPC+CRC transmitted
data (feature #14). Since the standard deviation is derived from the variance, the cor-
relation between them is high.
Based on the results of the histogram and the correlation analysis, we decided to reduce
the feature set. Instead of using all 14 features, only 7 features will be used in the clas-
sification experiments in Section 3.6. The following list shows the final 7 features we are
using.
 PC+EPC+CRC Transmission Time (original feature #1);
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 PC+EPC+CRC Power (original feature #3);
 Second Random Number T1 (original feature #6);
 Power in Channel (original feature #7);
 Power in Lower (original feature #9);
 Voltage Minimum in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data (original feature #12);
and
 Voltage Variance in PC+EPC+CRC Transmitted Data (original feature #13)
3.5 Features’ Ranking
After determining which features to use, we need to determine the significance of each of
the features as it applies to identification. Therefore, we ranked the features using a feature
scoring technique. Feature scoring is a feature selection technique that associates a score
with each of the features. For example, to select d features out of m original features, we
can use feature scoring to select the features with the highest (or lowest) d scores. In this
work, we are using a well-known approach that is based on Fisher criterion [25][27].
The key idea behind Fisher Scoring is to find a subset of features such that the data
points in different classes are as far as possible from each other, and the data points in the











Table 3.4: Feature Scoring of Feature when Identifying Manufacturer Models and Individual
Tags
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7
Manufacturer Identification 9 6 13 3 7 11 1
Tag Identification from A 13 11 7 3 9 1 6
Tag Identification from B 7 11 3 13 9 1 6
Tag Identification from C 7 11 3 13 9 1 6
Note: In this table, the features that are shown under f1 have the highest score while the
ones under f7 have the lowest score.
where c represents the class, ηk represents the number of data points in class k, µk is the
mean of class k and σk is the variance of class k.
We apply Fisher Scoring on the four sets of data. The first set represents all the readings
we have with three manufacturer models, which corresponds to three classes. The second,
third, and fourth data sets are associated with 100 different individual tags. Each set contains
the same manufacturer model tag. In other words, there are 100 classes in each of the last
three data sets. The rankings from Fisher Scoring are presented in Table 3.4.
The results in Table 3.4 show the significance of each feature in discriminating between
classes. As the results show, both manufacturer and tag identification require a combination
of power and timing features. Power features dominate, but the two timing features (#1 and
#6) do help during individual tag identification. Without the timing features, the TPRs
using 1-NN classifier decrease to 69%, 80%, and 62% for tag identification, which hints to
the importance of using multiple features for improving the performance of the classifiers.
3.6 Classification Experiments and Results
In this section, the classification experiments and the obtained results are presented. Be-
fore presenting the results, a quick introduction of the performance metrics is provided in
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Section 3.6.1. After introducing the used metrics, the three main experiments and their
results are provided in Section 3.6.2, Section 3.6.3, and Section 3.6.4. All the performed
classification results are done using a pattern recognition toolbox (PRTools) for Matlab [22].
3.6.1 Performance Evaluation
There are several metrics that can be used to determine how good the obtained classification
results are. The main source for any classification performance metrics is the confusion
matrix. In the confusion matrix, each column represents the instances in a predicted class,
while each row represents instances in an actual class. Table 3.5 shows the layout of any
confusion matrix.






As shown in Table 3.5, there are 4 possible outcomes of any classification result. The
following list describes these outcomes.
1. True Positive (TP): refers to any test instance that actually belongs to the positive
class and was predicted as positive;
2. True Negative (TN): refers to any test instance that actually belongs to the negative
class and was predicted as negative;
3. False Positive (FP): refers to any test instance that actually belongs to the negative
class and was predicted as positive; and
4. False Negative (FN): refers to any test instance that actually belongs to the positive
class and was predicted as negative.
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The confusion matrix in Table 3.5 shows the possible outcomes when we have only two
classes (binary classifier). In many classification experiments, there are n classes, with n > 2
to classify. In order to determine the four main counts (TP, TN, FP, and FN) for each class,
n binary confusion matrices need to be generated. The binary matrix for a class X will
have its positive class referring to instances from class X while the negative class refers to
any instance that belongs to a class other than X. Assuming that the number of training
samples is the same for each class and the number of testing samples is also the same, the
final counts can be determined by calculating the mean of each count value.
Once the final counts are present (after calculating the means), the performance evalu-
ation metrics can be calculated. The first evaluation metric that we used is the accuracy.
The accuracy refers to the percentage of instances that were correctly classified into either
positive or negative. The formula to calculate the accuracy is shown in Equation 3.5.
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(3.5)
It should be noted that in the case of multi-class problems, TN does not necessarily
mean a correct result. For example, if we have three classes to classify and we are building
the binary confusion matrix for class 3, a TN means that an instance belongs to either class
1 or 2 was classified into either class 1 or 2. In other words, it does not matter if class 1
instances were classified as class 2 or if class 2 instances were classified as class 1, as long as
they are not classified as class 3. In this case, they all belong to the TN count.
The second performance metric we are using is the true positive rate (TPR). TPR refers
to the percentage of positive instances that are classified as positive to the actual number of


























The final performance metric which we are using that is derived from the confusion
matrix is the false positive rate (FPR). The FPR metric refers to the percentage of negative





In order to show the significance of both the TPR and FPR, we would like to use a
security system analogy where people who are authorized to enter belongs to the positive
class and the ones who are not authorized to enter belongs to the negative class. TPR
represents the percentage of people who are authorized to enter and can enter. In other
words, TPR must be as high as possible. On the other hand, FPR must be as low as
possible since it represents the percentage of people who are not allowed to enter but they
can in-fact enter.
Another performance metric we are using is the area under the receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curve, also known as area under curve (AUC) [41]. ROC curves are a
graphical plot of the TPR vs. the FPR, for a binary classifier system as the discriminant
threshold is varied. ROC curves provide us with tools to select the best classification models
and discard bad ones by calculating the AUC for the curves generated by each of the models.
3.6.2 Enrolled/Unenrolled Tag Identification
The first classification experiment is conducted to classify the data we have into two classes:
enrolled and unenrolled. The purpose behind this experiment is to model a security system
in which only authorized tags are allowed to access (enrolled) and the rest of the tags are
not allowed access to the system (unenrolled).
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We trained the system using 66% of the available data and we tested the system using
the remaining 34%. We started by building an ROC graph that represents the performance
of 5 classification algorithms, namely, 1-NN, 3-NN, 5-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM. The
resultant graph is shown in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Enrolled/Unenrolled ROC Curves using 66/34
Figure 3.7 clearly shows that 1-NN out-performs every other classifier and in general k-
NN is better than Parzen and SVM. To be sure and to quantify how good 1-NN is compared
to the rest, the area under the curve is calculated. The AUC results are provided in Table 3.6.
The results from the AUC calculations agree with the initial observation shown in Fig-
ure 3.7. The results shows that the best classifier to use is 1-NN with an AUC of 99.29%
while the worst classifier to use is Parzen windows with 49.18% AUC. Since 1-NN is the best
classifier, we generated the confusion matrix which is shown in Table 3.7. The confusion
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Parzen Windows Classifier 49.18%
SVM 61.09%
matrix shows that 1-NN only miss-classified 15 samples out of 510 available test samples.
Out of the miss-classified sample, 6 out of 150 belonged to the enrolled class and 9 out of
360 belonged to the unenrolled class.
Table 3.7: 1-NN Enrolled/Unenrolled Confusion Matrix using 66/34
Predicted
Actual Enrolled Unenrolled
Enrolled 144 (TP) 6 (FN)
Unenrolled 9 (FP) 351 (TN)
To further support the results, we generated the TPR from each of the classifiers and the
results are shown in Table 3.8. In order to generate consistent data, 10-fold cross validation
is used. With 10-fold cross validation we partitioned the data we have into 10 equal size
parts. For 10 iterations, we train the classifier on 9 of the 10 parts and we test the classifier
using the remaining part, while keeping in mind that the testing part will not be duplicated
in any of the iterations. The reason behind using cross validation is to provide evidence that
the results we obtained are consistent. The TPR values in Table 3.8 agree with the results
we got from the AUC calculations. All the results show that 1-NN is the best classifier to
use while Parzen windows and SVM will generate poor results.
3.6.3 Tag’s Manufacturer Identification
The second classification experiment that was performed is to identify a tag’s manufacturer.
The data-set we collected has tags from three manufacturer (A, B, and C). We collected
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100 tags from each manufacturer. Each tag was measured five times for a total of 500
measurements per manufacturer.
We started the experiments by using 66% of the data for training the classification
models and the rest of the data to test these models. In other words, 66/34 is the used
training/testing ratio for all classifiers. After doing the classification experiments, we gener-
ated the confusion matrices for each classifier. Table 3.9 shows these confusion matrices. By
looking at the data in the confusion matrices we notice that regardless of the used classifier,
tags that belongs to model A will be always be classified correctly. Tags that belong to either
model B or C will have some instances miss-classified as the case with Parzen windows and
SVM.
In order to determine which of the classifier performs better, we repeated the classification
experiment using 10-fold cross validation. The TPR results are shown in Table 3.10. The
cross validation TPR results shows that 1-NN, 3-NN, and Parzen windows performs well with
a 99.93% TPR. 5-NN also performs well with a 99.87% TPR. The algorithm that performed
worst was SVM with a 95.00% TPR. Having a 95.00% TPR may not be bad in some systems,
but we were able to get better results using k-NN and Parzen windows.
In order to further support the obtained results, we generated a set of ROC curves for
each classifier. The ROC curves are shown in Figure 3.8. The ROC curves do not provide
any information regarding which of the classifiers is better than the rest. The ROC curves
shows an equal perfect performance for all the classifiers. In other words, all the classifiers
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Actual Manufacturer A Manufacturer B Manufacturer C
Manufacturer A 170 0 0
Manufacturer B 0 170 0
Manufacturer C 0 0 170
3-NN Classifier
Predicted
Actual Manufacturer A Manufacturer B Manufacturer C
Manufacturer A 170 0 0
Manufacturer B 0 170 0
Manufacturer C 0 1 169
5-NN Classifier
Predicted
Actual Manufacturer A Manufacturer B Manufacturer C
Manufacturer A 170 0 0
Manufacturer B 0 169 1
Manufacturer C 0 0 170
Parzen Windows Classifier
Predicted
Actual Manufacturer A Manufacturer B Manufacturer C
Manufacturer A 170 0 0
Manufacturer B 0 170 0
Manufacturer C 0 0 170
SVM Classifier
Predicted
Actual Manufacturer A Manufacturer B Manufacturer C
Manufacturer A 170 0 0
Manufacturer B 0 166 4
Manufacturer C 0 16 154








have a 100% AUC.
Figure 3.8: models ROC Curves using 66/34
3.6.4 Individual Tag Identification
The last experiment that was performed is to identify an individual tag. Since we have tags
from three manufacturers, we performed the same experiment three times, each time for a
different manufacturer.
3.6.4.1 Identifying Tags From Manufacturer A
In order to identify models from manufacturer A, only tags from manufacturer A were used
for training and testing. Since we have 100 tags that represent each model, we trained our
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models to distinguish between 100 classes. One issue we faced, is that only five instances
are available as representatives of each class. We generated the ROC curves using 66% of
the data for training (three instances) and 34% of the data for testing (two instances). The
resultant ROC is shown in Figure 3.9. The AUC that is associated with each of the ROC
curves is provided in Table 3.11.
Figure 3.9: Manufacturer A ROC Curves using 66/34





Parzen Windows Classifier 73.74%
SVM 98.99%
Since only five instances are available, and in order to provide enough evidence of the
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ROC results, we applied 5-fold cross validation. With 5-fold cross validation we divided the
data for each class into five partitions. We train the model using four partitions and we test
the resultant model using the fifth partition. The previous procedure is repeated five time
while rotating the testing and training partitions. In other words, every partition will be
used for testing exactly one time. The 5-fold cross validation TPR and accuracy results are
shown in Table 3.12.






Parzen Windows 59.0% 99.17%
SVM 0.0% 98.58%
3.6.4.2 Identifying Tags From Manufacturer B
The second individual tag identification experiment is like the first one with only one dif-
ference; the data used for training and testing belong to tags from manufacturer B. First,
we generate the ROC curves that describe that classifiers performance. The ROC curves
are shown in Figure 3.10. To convert the ROC results into numerical data that makes it
easier to compare, we calculate the AUC for each of the ROC curves. The AUC results are
shown in Table 3.13. The results show that the performance of k-NN is much better than
the performance of the other classifiers.
Next, we determine the TPR and the accuracy of the classifiers when identifying tags of
model B. The results for the 5-fold cross validation are shown in Table 3.14.
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Figure 3.10: Manufacturer B ROC Curves using 66/34





Parzen Windows Classifier 99.49%
SVM 98.48%
3.6.4.3 Identifying Tags From Manufacturer C
Finally, we identify individual tags that belong to manufacturer C. As the case with the
previous two experiments, we have 100 classes to classify. Each tag is represented by five
instances which makes it hard to provide a good model description of a tag model. The
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Parzen Windows 58.6% 99.18%
SVM 5.0% 98.56%
generated ROC curves are similar to the ones that was generated for tags from manufacturers
A and B. The ROC curves shows that k-NN has a better performance than Parzen windows
and SVM. The ROC curves are shown in Figure 3.11 and its associated AUC is provided in
Table 3.15.
Figure 3.11: Manufacturer C ROC Curves using 66/34
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Parzen Windows Classifier 84.85%
SVM 92.42%
The final test that was performed to determine the classifiers performance on the problem
of identifying tags from manufacturer C is to determine the TPR and the accuracy using
5-fold cross validation. The results for the 5-fold cross validation are provided in Table 3.16.






Parzen Windows 58.6% 99.17%
SVM 0.0% 98.53%
3.6.5 Results Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results that were obtained from the previously listed experi-
ments. In the first experiment, we divided the data into either enrolled or unenrolled class.
66% of the data was used to train the classifiers and the remaining 34% was used to test
the classifiers. The results show that k-NN performs better than the other classifiers. An
average of 96.5% AUC was obtained when k-NN was used compared to Parzen windows and
SVM with 49.18% and 61.09%, respectively. 10-fold cross validation was used to further
support the AUC results. k-NN had an average of 96.28% compared to 70.00% for either
Parzen windows or SVM.
In the second experiment, we used multi-class classifiers to identify tags based on their
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manufacturer. The manufacturer identification results show almost perfect classification
performance for all the used classifiers, which is clear by glancing at the ROC curve in Fig-
ure 3.8. The presented confusion matrix shows that instances which belong to manufacturer
A can all be correctly identified, with occasionally miss-classification of manufacturer B or
C. The 10-fold cross validation results show that an average of 99.91% TPR was obtained
when k-NN is used. Parzen windows and SVM had a 99.93% and 95.00% TPR, respectively.
The final experiment that was conducted is to identify an individual tag. To perform
the task of individual tag identification, we divided this experiment into three experiments.
In each of the experiments, only tags from a particular manufacturer were used for training
and testing the classification models. The major issue we faced when identifying individual
tags is that only five instances are available as representatives of any tag class. Having
only five instances to train and test the classifiers will create a large error margin since we
are dividing the already small data set between testing and training. In other words, the
classification models we are using are not converging. The ROC curves were generated using
three instances per class to train a classifier models, which was tested with the remaining
two instances. The ROC curves and their associated AUC calculations strongly recommend
k-NN classifier to use over Parzen and SVM. To further support these recommendation we
applied 5-fold cross validation and we calculated the average TPR. For manufacturer A, 1-
NN, 3-NN, 5-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM had a 90.2%, 83.8%, 77.0%, 59.0%, and 0.0%,
respectively. For manufacturer B, 1-NN, 3-NN, 5-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM had a
TPR of 90.6%, 84.6%, 77.0%, 58.6%, and 5.0%, respectively. As for manufacturer C, 1-NN,
3-NN, 5-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM had a TPR of 90.4%, 74.4%, 76.2%, 58.6%, and
0.0%, respectively.
All the evidence from the previous results suggests that k-NN is the best choice for
identification. k-NN works by comparing the test instance with all the training instances
directly. It computes the difference between every training instance and the testing instance
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and selects the k instances that are the closest to the testing instance. A weighting algorithm
that is shown in Equation 1.1 is used to classify the presented testing instance.
Another point we would like to mention is how much the amount of available data
influences the outcome results. TPR is the ratio between TP and TP +FN , while accuracy
calculates the amount of correct classification from the perspective of one class. In the case
of individual tag identification, each class has only one instance that belongs to it. Recall
that we measured 100 tags for each manufacturer. This means that when calculating the
TPR and the accuracy for class X, one instance does belong to X, while the remaining 99
instances belong to the remaining classes. For example, as long as the 99 instances are not
confused with class X the TN count will be high, which drives the accuracy results to be
high even if we have a 0.0% TPR. Therefore, the TPR can be low but the accuracy can be
high. For example, when identifying tags from manufacturer A, the TPR for SVM is 0.0%
while the accuracy is 98.58%. The previous example shows how easy it is to deceive a person




In this chapter, we disscus pattern recognition using Hidden Markov models (HMM). In
order to identify tags using HMM, we focus on the time-voltage wave form that we extracted
using [2]. A sample of the time-voltage waveform is shown in Figure 4.1. In order to be able
to use HMM, the system to be modeled needs to generate some observable output. This
output can be used directly as in Section 4.1, or it can be processed as in Sections 4.2 - 4.4.
The time-voltage waveform we are focusing on is the tag’s transmission of the PC+EPC+
CRC data. As shown in Figure 4.1, the voltage values alternate between two main values,
which is interpreted by the reader as binary code (ones and zeros).
In this section, five experiments are conducted. Each experiment is divided into two
parts: manufacturer identification and individual tag identification. The difference between
the five experiments is based on the type of observations we are using as inputs to the
HMM. In the first experiment, we use the time-voltage waveform without any processing.
The remaining four experiments involve some data processing. In the second experiment,
we divide the time-voltage waveform into frames of ten observations each and we calculate
the power in each frame using Equation 4.1, where V is the Vrms component of the frame’s
voltage sequence, while 50 refers to the used impedance. In the third experiment, the
intervals that the voltage sequence stays in high or low are being calculated. Fig. 4.4 shows
the transition points. The fourth experiment combines the power and timing. As in the
third experiment, we calculate the intervals at which the voltage stays in the high and the
low ranges, but we are adding the power in these intervals to the timing data. In the final
experiment, we use the models generated by the second and third experiment and we combine
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the results of these models by assigning weights to them. Thus, we are using both the time
and power observations but instead of using a single model as in the fourth experiment, we








All the HMM experiments were conducted using the Matlab toolbox [42] which was
designed based on the theoretical knowledge presented in [54].
Figure 4.1: Time-voltage waveform sample
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4.1 HMM Using Voltage Observations
In this section, we focus on the time-voltage waveform as the direct input to the HMM in
order to identify a tag’s manufacturer. No data processing is used. The data we have are
from tags from three manufacturers (A, B, and C). We built the Markov models using 80%
of the data (400 instances) and we tested the models using the remaining 20% of the data
(100 instances).
Figure 4.2: ROC curves for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem using
Raw Voltages as Observed Features
The confusion matrix that is in Table 4.1 shows that 28% of manufacturer A tags were
confused as manufacturer B, 13% of manufacturer B tags were confused as manufacturer
A, and 17% of manufacturer C tags were confused as manufacturer A. From the confusion
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matrix, the TPR and the accuracy are calculated, and provided in Table 4.2. The results
show that manufacturer B has the highest TPR with 87%, while manufacturer C has the
highest accuracy with 92.67%.
Finally, the ROC curves that describe the performance of HMM in identifying each of the
manufacturers are shown in Figure 4.2. The ROC curves matches the results obtained from
the confusion matrix that show tags from manufacturer A with the poorest performance and
tags from manufacturers B and C with close performance.
Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem
using Raw Voltages as Observed Features
Predicted Manufacturer
Actual Manufacturer A B C
A 68 28 4
B 13 87 0
C 17 1 82
Table 4.2: Manufacturer Identification TPR, Accuracy, and AUC Results Using Voltage
Observations
Manufacturer TPR Accuracy AUC
A 68.00% 79.33% 79.38%
B 87.00% 86.00% 94.87%
C 82.00% 92.67% 96.16%
4.2 HMM Using Power Observations
The second experiment we performed using HMM preprocesses the obtained time-voltage
sequence. We divide the time-voltage sequence into frames. Each frame has 10 voltage
readings (observations). We calculate the rms value of the frame’s voltage sequence and use
the Vrms values to calculate the power in each frame using Equation 4.1. The ROC curves
in Figure 4.3 show an improvement on the performance compared with the ROC curves in
Figure 4.2.
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The confusion matrix for power observations is provided in Table 4.3 and the associated
TPR and accuracy calculations are provided in Table 4.4. As expected, the performance for
identifying all manufacturers improved. The TPR for identifying tags from Manufacturer A
increased to 86% compared to 68% when using voltages directly without any preprocessing.
Regarding Manufacturer B and C, the TPR jumped to 93% and 95% compared to 87%
and 82%, respectively. The same improvement happened with the accuracy of the HMM. It
jumped from 79.33%, 86.00%, and 92.67% to 92.00%, 93.67%, and 97.00% for manufacturers
A, B, and C, respectively.
Figure 4.3: ROC curves for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem using
Power as Observed Features
The results from this experiment show that preprocessing the data will result in better
performance. We expect that further preprocessing will improve the results even more. We
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Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem
using Power as Observed Features
Predicted Manufacturer
Actual Manufacturer A B C
A 86 11 3
B 6 93 1
C 4 1 95
Table 4.4: Manufacturer Identification TPR, Accuracy, and AUC Results Using Power Ob-
servations
Manufacturer TPR Accuracy AUC
A 86.00% 92.00% 93.89%
B 93.00% 93.67% 93.78%
C 95.00% 97.00% 97.50%
also expect that combining different data types will yield better performance as the case
with classical pattern recognition algorithms.
4.3 HMM Using Time Observations
In this experiment, we use the transition points that are illustrated in Figure 4.4. We
calculate the time between each of the points, and use the intervals as the observations
input for the HMM. The ROC curves are shown in Figure 4.5 while the associated AUC are
shown in Table 4.6. The generated ROC curve shows that identifying tags from manufacturer
A performs much better than identifying tags from manufacturers B or C. By calculating the
area under the ROC curves we found that the AUC for manufacturer A is 97.09% compared
to 75.29% and 37.18% for manufacturers B and C, respectively. We must keep in mind that
ROC is a technique to compare performance; more performance metrics are necessary to
compare the work we did with other people.
The ROC curves clearly show that using timing for manufacturer A will yield much better
results than tags from manufacturers B and C, but by how much? To answer this question
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Figure 4.4: Voltage transitions between high and low ranges
we generate the confusion matrix, which is provided in Table 4.5. From the confusion matrix
the TPR and the accuracy metrics are calculated and shown in Table 4.6. Although tags
from manufacturer A have the best AUC, their TPR and accuracy are lower than that of
B and slightly higher than C. The accuracy to identify tags from manufacturer A or C is
90.67% and it jumps to 97.33% if we are identifying tags from B. On the other hand, the
TPR values are 91%, 94%, and 83% for tags from manufacturer A, B, and C, respectively.
Table 4.5: Confusion Matrix for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem
Using Timing as Observed Feature
Predicted Manufacturer
Actual Manufacturer A B C
A 91 0 9
B 4 94 2
C 15 2 83
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem using
time as Observed Feature
Table 4.6: Manufacturer Identification TPR, Accuracy, and AUC Results Using Time Ob-
servations
Manufacturer TPR Accuracy AUC
A 91.00% 90.67% 97.09%
B 94.00% 97.33% 75.29%
C 83.00% 90.67% 37.18%
4.4 HMM Using Time and Power Observations
By looking at the data we derived from the experiments presented in Section 4.2 and Sec-
tion 4.3, we notice that tags from manufacturer A can be identified better using timing
observations while tags from manufacturers B and C can be identified better using power
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observations. In this experiment, we combine both the power and timing observations. As
the case in Section 4.3, we divide the data we have into frames. Each frame consists of the
voltage sequence that is between transitions (the transitions are illustrated in Figure 4.4).
Each frame sequence is translated into two observations. The first observation represents
the time it took to transmit the voltage sequence. The second observation represents the
power that is contained within the voltage sequence. Power calculations are done using
Equation 4.1.
First, we generate the ROC curves that give an indication of how good one model is
compared to the other models. The resultant ROC curves are provided in Figure 4.6. By
looking at the ROC curves, we notice that none of them are as good as we expected. It
looks like combining power and timing will degrade the performance instead of improving it.
Next, we generate the confusion matrix to further determine the performance of the models.
Table 4.7: Confusion Matrix for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem
using timing and power as Observed Features
Predicted Manufacturer
Actual Manufacturer A B C
A 82 16 2
B 48 42 10
C 32 18 50
From the confusion matrix data that is provided in Table 4.7 and the performance metrics
that are provided in Table 4.8, we notice that none of the manufacturer identification models
provide acceptable results. Tags from manufacturer A have a TPR of 82%, an accuracy of
67.33%, and an AUC of 74.87%. Tags from manufacturer B have a TPR of 42%, an accuracy
of 69.33%, and an AUC of 60.10%. Tags from manufacturer C have a TPR of 50%, an
accuracy of 79.33%, and an AUC of 69.49%.
From this experiment, we notice that combining several measurements together into the
same model decreases the performance. In the next section, we combine timing and power
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Figure 4.6: ROC curves for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem using
time and power as Observed Features
Table 4.8: Manufacturer Identification TPR, Accuracy, and AUC Results Using timing and
power Observations
Manufacturer TPR Accuracy AUC
A 82.00% 67.33% 74.87%
B 42.00% 69.33% 60.10%
C 50.00% 79.33% 69.49%
but we use separate models for each of them instead of one model.
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4.5 HMM Using Time and Power Observations In Separate Models
The previous experiment showed that combining the power observations and the time obser-
vations into one stream will degrade the performance of the hidden Markov models. In this
experiment, we use both the time observations and the power observations to identify tags.
Instead of combining both observations into one model, we build two models: one model
using power observations alone and the other model is built using time observations alone.
In order to formulate a final decision, we gather the decisions from both the time and
power models using weights. Since we have two models to use and there are three classes
to identify any given instance, a 3 × 2 weight matrix is used. In any row of the weight
matrix, the relations shown in Equation 4.2 must be true where Wit is the weight given to
instances from manufacturer i for the time model, and Wip is the weight given to instances
from manufacturer i for the power model.
Wit +Wip = 1 (4.2)
We use trial and error to determine the best weight matrix. Table 4.9 shows the weight
matrix we used to generate the results shown in Table 4.11. The confusion matrix that is
responsible for this performance is shown in Table 4.10.





The first thing we did is to combine the data we got by using testing instances on the
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Figure 4.7: ROC curves for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem using
Time and Power as Observed Features in Separate Models
timing and power models. The Matlab code that uses the weights to combine the results
from the time and power models is provided in Appendix C. The resultant ROC curves are
provided in Figure 4.7. The extracted ROC data show that instances from manufacturer A
does have an AUC of 45.37% compared to 83.42% and 97.18% for instance from manufacturer
B and C, respectively.
Table 4.10: Confusion Matrix for HMM applied to the Manufacturer Identification Problem
Using Timing and Power Observations in Separate Models
Predicted Manufacturer
Actual Manufacturer A B C
A 91 0 9
B 0 97 3
C 0 4 96
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Table 4.11: Manufacturer Identification TPR, Accuracy, and AUC Results Using Timing
and Power Observations in Separate Models
Manufacturer TPR Accuracy AUC
A 91.00% 97.00% 45.37%
B 97.00% 97.67% 83.42%
C 96.00% 94.67% 97.18%
After generating the ROC curves, we noticed that the performance improved compared to
the performance of the models when the timing and the power observations were combined
into a single observations stream. Encouraged with the results of the ROC curves, we
generated the confusion matrix. The confusion matrix is provided in Table 4.10. The
confusion matrix shows improvement. In fact, the resultant confusion matrix is much better
than using either the timing observations or the power observations by themselves. From
the confusion matrix, we calculated the TPR and the accuracy. The results are provided in
Table 4.11.
4.6 HMM Manufacturer Identification Results Discussion
In the previous sections, we focused on using HMM to identify the manufacturer of a specific
passive UHF RFID tag. Five experiments were performed. In all the experiments, we focused
on the PC+EPC+CRC tag’s transmission, which was extracted and processed to generate
the observations for the identification process. The extracted observations include voltage,
power, and timing data. Table 4.12 provides a summary of the manufacturer identification
results.
In the first experiment, we used the time-voltage waveform “as is” without any pre-
processing. The results showed moderate performance. Using time-voltage waveform as
observations provided us with an average TPR of 79%, an average accuracy of 86%, and an
average AUC of 90.13%. Tags from manufacturer A showed the worst performance, while
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tags from manufacturer B showed the best TPR. Also, tags from manufacturer C showed
the best accuracy. The results of using voltage observations are provided in Table 4.2.
After using raw voltage observations, we proceeded to use power observations. We
divided the time-voltage observations into frames of 10 readings each. We calculated the Vrms
values of each frame, and used Equation 4.1 to calculate the power. The results showed an
improvement compared to when using raw voltages. An average TPR of 91.33%, an average
accuracy of 94.22%, and an average AUC of 95.1% were obtained. Tags from manufacturer
C had the best TPR, accuracy, and AUC. The detailed results are shown in Table 4.4.
Since preprocessing the PC+EPC+CRC transmission provides better results than using
the raw observations, we explored other preprocessing techniques. By zooming into the
time-voltage waveform, we noticed many transitions from low voltages to high voltages as
shown in Figure 4.4. We processed the time-voltage wave sequence to find these transitions.
We calculate the time between each of the transitions and used the resultant values as the
observations. The results show an average TPR of 89.33%, an average accuracy of 92.89%,
and an average AUC of 69.85%. Tags from manufacturer A had the best AUC. Tags from
manufacturer B had the best TPR and accuracy. Surprisingly, tags from manufacturer C
had the worst performance. Detailed results are shown in Table 4.6.
The fact that using either voltage or power yields acceptable performance for tags of
manufacturer C while using time yields bad results for tags of same manufacturer led us to
believe that combining features might provide us with better results than using any obser-
vation type by itself. Therefore, we used the same method to extract the timing information
but we added to it the power between transitions. The results show an average TPR of 58%,
an average accuracy of 72%, and an average AUC of 68.15%. Detailed results are in Ta-
ble 4.8. Combining the time and power observations degraded the performance. Therefore,
we created separate models for the power and the time and combined the results by applying
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weights.
The final experiment we performed is based on the previous idea of using weights. The
main rule to be enforced is that the sum of the weight must be equal to 1 as seen in
Equation 4.2. We combined the models in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. The weights are
provided in Table 4.9. The reason behind using separate models rather than a single model
with both observations is due to:
1. Combining observations will result in a degradation in the performance as seen in
Table 4.8; and
2. Some manufacturer tags show a good performance when using time observations com-
pared with time observations while instances from other manufactures show a good
performance when power observations are used compared to using time observations.
The results when using separate models while applying weights to combine the results
showed the best performance when using HMM. The results show an average TPR of 94.67%,
an average accuracy of 96.45%, and an average AUC of 75.32%. With the exception of the
AUC, we are getting the best TPR and accuracy among all performed HMM experiments.
4.7 Individual Tag Identification
In all of the previous sections, we focus on identifying a tag’s manufacturer. We use different
observations to determine which of them is the best for identifying a tag’s manufacturer.
In this section, we expand the previous work by identifying a specific tag rather than its
manufacturer. We are identifying 100 tags of three manufacturers. In other words, each
experiment will be repeated three times (since we have three manufacturers). Because of
the large number of classes to identify, we will not be presenting the ROC curves and their
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AUCs. We will only present the TPR and the accuracy measurements. Also, we will not
be presenting the confusion matrices since each of them will have a size of 100× 100. Since
it is hard to present all the data for the 100 classes, we are calculating the average for the
classes taken from each manufacturer model for both the TPR and the accuracy metrics.
Also, because only five instances are available for each class, we are using four instances to
build the class model and the remaining instance will be used to test the model. The data
is shown in Table 4.12.
The results show that we are getting a very low TPR. The TPR ranges from 19% when
using voltage observations on tags from manufacturer B, to only 1% when using power and
timing observations in the same stream with tags from any manufacturer. On the other
hand, an accuracy higher than 98% was obtained in all the tests. The fact that we are
having a high accuracy and a very low TPR shows how important it is to find the correct
ratio between the number of instances we used to build each of the class models, the number
of instances we use to test each of the available models, and the number of models we have.
The results in Table 4.12 show the importance of balancing the number of test samples
to the number of classes we want to classify. In the experiment we performed in this section,
we only have one instance to test any of the models. Having one instance means that if we
misclassify that instance a TPR of zero will result. Also having only four instance to build
and train the models is not enough to have a good convergence of the models log-likelihood.
Notice that even though we have an extremely low TPR, the accuracy is fairy high. The
reason for this is because the accuracy calculations include the TN count. The formula to
calculate the accuracy is shown in Equation 3.5. As shown in Figure 3.6, the TN count does
not reflect accurate classification. The TN counts an instance that is not from class X and
was not classified as class X. In other words, having one instance of each class while having

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Signal Authentication using Fingerprints
Previously, we discussed identifying an RFID tag based on its transmitted signals. Recall,
identification is a one-to-many process in which an instance is mapped into a category that
is already defined. In this chapter, we focus on authenticating an RFID tag based on its
transmitted signals. Authentication is a one-to-one process in which we want to verify that
an RFID tag is the one it claims to be.
In this chapter, we focus on tag and reader authentication. In tag authentication, we
verify that the tag is the tag it claims to be. In reader authentication, we verify that
the reader we are using to read and to communicate with the tags is not compromised.
We develop an authentication system based on fingerprints. There are three parts of the
authentication system: RFID tag(s), RFID reader(s), and a back-end server. A graphical
representation of the system is shown in Figure 1.3. As Figure 1.3 shows, we only have one
server, which is completely trusted. This server will have direct links to any RFID reader in
the system. The readers have the responsibility of communicating with the tags, extracting
the feature vector from these tags, and communicating with the server to determine if the
tags are authentic or not. An authentication system can be divided into two main processes:
the enrollment process and the verification process. In this chapter, we will use the words
authentication and verification interchangeably.
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5.1 Enrollment Process
During the enrollment process, tags are queried and the representative feature vector is
measured. Figure 5.1 shows the flowchart of the enrollment process. During the enrollment
process, each tag is queriedX number of times. For each query, the tag’s response is recorded,
features are extracted, and the feature vector is stored. After collecting X feature vectors,
several statistics of each of the features, such as mean, variance, and standard deviation are
calculated. By calculating the means of the features, an average feature vector is created.
This average feature vector will be used for any future authentication request. The received
statistics, the feature vector, and the X feature vector readings are stored on the server. The
hash of the mean feature vector is then calculated and stored on the tag. A lightweight hash
function such as PRESENT-80 can be used [8]. PRESENT-80 is designed specifically to be
compatible with RFID environment. It was designed with all the power, memory, and size
constraints in mind. The server can either store one hash that describes the entire feature
vector or it can store a single hash for each of the available features (a vector of N hashes,
where N is the length of the feature vector).
We assume that the features are independent of each other and that they follow a Gaus-
sian distribution. Since Gaussian distribution is assumed, the mean and the standard devia-
tion are needed so that the distribution for each of the features can be estimated. Since each
of the features’ distribution parameters will be used in the verification process, a reference to
them must be stored on the same tag that was used to extract those values. Upon request,
the tag will send the stored hash value to the reader, which in turn will send it to the server
that has the necessary data.
To summarize, during enrollment, multiple feature vectors of the tags to be enrolled are
collected. For each feature in the feature vector, the mean, variance, standard deviation is
calculated. The feature vectors and the other extracted values are stored on the server. This
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Figure 5.1: Enrollment process of the RFID authentication system
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table is keyed using a hash of the mean feature vector. A copy of the hash is stored on the
enrolled tag to be used as a reference for future authentication requests.
5.2 Verification Process
During the verification process, a tag that was previously enrolled is authenticated. Recall
that during the enrollment process, a hash of the feature vector is stored in the memory
banks of the tag. When the tag is to be authenticated, the stored hash value is retrieved
and sent to the server. At the same time, the reader uses the data transmitted by the tag
to extract a feature vector that describes this tag. Using the hash value, the server retrieves
the average feature vector calculated at enrollment, including weights, and the standard
deviation of each of the features. The server will then communicate with the reader to
determine if the presented tag is authentic or not.
In order to determine the tag’s authenticity, the distance between the newly read feature
vector and the mean feature vector is calculated. A simplified authentication system based
on the distance is presented in Figure 5.2. Different features have different impact on the
tag’s authenticity. Features with high variance are assigned lower weights than features with
low variance, (the reason for the before-mentioned statement is due to the presence of noise
when the tag is being read). Having high variance means that the feature reading will be less
accurate, while having low variance means that we can maintain high confidence in the read
feature. To calculate the variance, we normalize all the features so that they are between 0
and 1, as shown in Equation 5.1. In Equation 5.1, max and min refers to the maximum and
minimum values of a certain feature for a particular tag, while xi refers to an instance of the












(xi − µ)2 (5.2)
Using variance, we calculate the weight of each of the features. The weights must satisfy
the condition in Equation 5.3. Since the feature with the less variance will have the highest
weight, we are using Equation 5.4 to calculate the weight of each feature. The weights and
variance calculations occur during enrollment and are retrieved using the hash value during
the verification process. Using the weights, we verify each weighted feature based on distance
as shown in Figure 5.2. The distance is compared to a threshold value that is based on the
enrolled feature vectors. If the distance between the recently read feature vector (the one
that was read for authentication) and the mean feature vector is less than the threshold,
then the tag is authentic; otherwise, the tag is considered to be unauthentic.
N∑
i=1








Next, we introduce a complete verification process the uses distances between enrolled
data and recently read data. A flowchart of this verification system is provided in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.2: How to calculate the distance between feature vectors
First, we introduce a simple authentication system that optimistically assumes no at-
tempts to fool the system, which is shown in Figure 5.3. The verification process starts with
the reader collecting the tag’s response for a specific query. The reader then extracts the
feature vector from that response. The reader asks the tag to transmit the hash value stored
in its memory banks. Upon receiving the hash value, the reader will send it to the back-end
server, which uses it to retrieve the mean feature vector, and the thresholds associated with
each of the features. Using the retrieved mean feature vector and the associated thresholds,
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the server sends these values to the reader. The reader computes the distance between the
received feature and the tag’s extracted feature. Using the threshold, the reader determines
if that feature can actually be generated from the tag or not. The decision is sent back to
the server. Once the server receives the reader’s response, it sends the next feature mean
value. Once all the features’ mean values are sent to the reader and the decisions are col-
lected, the final decision of the tag’s authenticity is made. The final decision is made using
Equation 5.5, where D is the final decision score, N is the length of the feature vector, di is





di × wi (5.5)
Once the final score is calculated, it is compared with a threshold. If that decision is
greater that the threshold value, then the tag is authentic. If it is not greater than the
threshold, then it is not authentic. The previously discussed authentication technique has
its drawbacks.
1. The algorithm ignores the possibility of having a compromised reader; and
2. There are no precautions taken to guard against replay, eavesdropping, or man-in-the-
middle attacks.
In this remainder of this section, we focus on solving the compromised reader problem.
To solve the other problems, we assume that the reader and the server are using modern
communication authentication protocols [10] [9] [31] [37] [50].
RFID readers are usually geographically separated and in enough numbers to monitor
all passing objects with attached RFID tags. An intruder can theoretically attack one or
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Figure 5.3: Simple tag authentication process
more of the readers and install special software to send false data to the server regarding the
authenticity of a certain tag. (We must be able to distinguish between compromised
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readers and normal readers). In order to do so, we introduce the concept of decoys. A
decoy is a feature value that could not possibly be generated by the tag we are authenticating.
For example, assume that a tag was enrolled that has a time feature with values between 400
microseconds and 500 microseconds. An example decoy time feature is 100 microseconds.
A normal reader will respond to the server’s decoy by saying that the tag failed that test,
while a compromised reader may respond by saying that it passed the test. In other words,
a compromised reader will always respond to the server by saying that the tag passed each
of the tests. Once the server receives a positive response to a decoy, the probability that
the reader is compromised increases. The error could be caused by noise or measurement
problems. An authentication system using decoys is shown in Figure 5.4. A mixture of
decoys and real measurements should be sent to verify.
Before sending the features to the reader, the server must determine how many and which
of the features to replace by decoys. The number of decoys used must be such that the reader
will have very small probability to guess the decoys. At the same time, it must be such that
the remaining features can authenticate a tag with high certainty. In the system we propose,
the server selects at random which of the features is to be replaced with decoys. Once the
server determines the decoys position in the feature vector, it replaces the associated features
with the decoys, and sends the new feature vector to the reader.
When the server sends a decoy, the normal response from the reader is that the tag did not
pass that feature’s test. Therefore, the reader sends a fail result to the server. A compromised
reader may respond with a pass score for each of the received features (including the decoys).
When the server receives a pass score for a decoy, the server knows that the reader may be
compromised. In the system we present, the tests refer to the distance calculated between
the current read feature and the mean of that feature (sent by the server). If the calculated
distance is near zero, then the result of the test is assumed to be a pass; otherwise, the test
result is a failure. Since we are using distance, there is no hard score that can be considered
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as a pass. A passing score depends entirely on the distribution parameters of that feature
(mean, variance, and standard deviation). There are two actions the server could follow
when receiving the reader responses:
1. The server could continue to send features to the reader even if the reader sent a pass
score for a sent decoy; or
2. The server could keep monitoring the responses sent from the reader. If the number of
decoys with received pass responses exceeds a certain amount, the server could ignore
the reader or consider it compromised.
For the first scenario, the server checks if the responses from the reader for the decoys
were all as expected (failed score). If the responses are as expected, then the server combines
the received scores of all the genuine features (the ones that are not decoys) into a final score
that is compared to a threshold. If the final score is greater than the threshold, the tag is
authentic; otherwise, the tag is not authentic. It is worth mentioning that if this scenario
is used, the server can send the feature vector in one session and receive the final decision
vector, thus, reducing the communication cost between the reader and the server.
If the second scenario is used, the reader builds a reputation profile for each of the
available readers. When the server sends a decoy to the reader and receives an unexpected
response (pass), the reader’s reputation at the server decreases. As more decoys are answered
with a passing score, the reader’s reputation keeps on decreasing until it goes beyond a certain
threshold. When the reputation of the reader drops below that threshold, the server assumes
that the reader is compromised, and it takes appropriate actions such as ignoring the reader,
notifying the system administrator, etc.
Next, we will introduce the methods to determine the threshold value, number and value
of the decoys, and the tag score. All of the previous problems are solved using the same
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Figure 5.4: Proposed tag authentication process
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principle. There are two assumptions that are related to the features extracted from the
tags transmission.
 The features are assumed to follow a Gaussian (normal) distribution; and
 The features are assumed to be independent of each other.
The Gaussian distribution (also known as Normal distribution) is a continuous proba-
bility distribution that has a bell-curve shaped probability density function. The Gaussian
function is shown in Equation 5.6, where x is the random variable, µ is the mean of the ran-









As shown in Figure 5.5, the center of the bell-curve is located at the mean, while the
spread of the curve depends upon the standard deviation of the random variable. Figure 5.5
shows three random variables that are in the interval [-40, 40]. The curve with the lowest
peak has the highest standard deviation (σ2 = 8), the curve with the highest peak has
the smallest standard deviation (σ2 = 2), while the middle curve has a standard deviation
(σ2 = 4). All the curves are centered around zero, which is the mean of the random variables.
After determining the distributions of each of the observed features for each of the
enrolled tags, the threshold at which we will consider that a tag is authentic or not is
calculated. The threshold we propose is a probability based threshold. Out of the enrolled
values of a specific tag, for each of the features, we select the value that is furthest from
the mean value of that feature. Using the Gaussian function, we determine the probability
that this value occurs. (The reason behind selecting the furthest feature read is because the
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Figure 5.5: Gaussian Distribution Examples
furthest feature value happens when the noise is at its highest). Once all the probabilities
are determined, we use Equation 5.7 to calculate the overall tag’s threshold, where dist is
the distance between the mean of the ith feature and the measured values with the maximum






To use the proposed threshold, the server sends the mean values to the reader. The reader
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calculates the distance between the mean value and the measured feature value, and sends
the distance back to the server. The server calculates the probability that this distance can
happen using Equation 5.8, where dist refers to the distance between the feature’s current
read and the mean of that feature. After sending all of the mean feature vector and receiving





and it compares it with the threshold calculate using equation 5.7.
If the current cumulative probability is less than the threshold, then the tag is authentic;





Figure 5.6 describes the choice of using Equation 5.8 as the threshold. In the rest of this
section, the following symbols are extensively used:
 m, refers to the feature’s observed read that is the furthest from the feature’s mean
value (only observations during enrollment are considered);
 dm, refers to the distance between the mean of the feature being tested, and the furthest
enrolled read from the mean;
 f , refers to the observed read of a feature;
 df , refers to the distance between the feature value sent from the server and the feature
observation the reader just extracted from the tag to be authenticated;
 c, refers to a decoy sent from the server to the reader;
 dc, refers to distance between the sent decoy and the feature observation the reader
just extracted from the tag to be authenticated;
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 dmc, refers to the distance between the sent decoy and the furthest read from the
feature mean (m);
 C, refers to the probability an observed feature occurs near the sent decoy (very small
probability);
 M , refers to the probability that observations between the feature mean and the m
observation occurs;
 N , refers to the number of available features; and
 D, refers to the number of decoys used.
By referring to Figure 5.6, the probability of a reading to occur that does not exceed
the furthest one measured during enrollment for a certain feature (m) is equal to the area
A+2B, which we refer to as M . On the other hand, the probability of the recently extracted
feature is equal to the area A. For a tag to be authentic, the relation in Equation 5.9 must
hold true. In other words, the area under the curve that is bounded by reads closer to the
mean (A) should be less than the area bounded by the reads that are furthest from the mean
(M).
∀iAi ≤Mi (5.9)
Equation 5.7 does not take into account the existence of decoys in the system. To
accommodate decoys, we seperate the features selected as decoys from the genuine features.
The authentication process is separated into two processes.
1. Compromised reader test: To perform the compromised reader test, we only focus
on the responses for the decoys. When the server receives a response for a decoy, it
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Figure 5.6: Threshold and Probability Relations
expects the distance to be larger than the distance between the decoy and furthest
read from the mean (m). The probability of a feature to occur within the distance sent




If the reader tries to fool the server, a small distance will be sent back to the server,
which results in a probability equal to area C shown in Figure 5.6. The reader is
assumed to be compromised if the cumulative probability of the decoys is less than a






















f(x)dx, if c > µ
(5.11)
2. Tag authenticity test: If the reader is assumed not to be compromised, we proceed
with the tag authenticity test. We follow the same approach we followed before, but
instead of using all the features (N), we will use only genuine features (not decoys) (N−











Having decoys in the authentication system enables us to identify compromised reader(s).
Some other questions arise from the use of decoys. What if the server stops sending features
to the reader when enough decoys are sent and the reader’s responses indicate that it is
compromised? In addition, how many decoys should be sent to the reader? The solution for
both questions is to have the server check the status of each of the decoys as soon as they
arrive.
When the server receives the response of the first decoy, it checks the probability of
the distance calculated by the reader using Equation 5.13, which holds true if the reader is
compromised. If the resultant probability is less than the expected one, the server sends a
decoy again after a number of sent features that are half the ones that preceded the first
decoy. If the response for that decoy is still less than the expected response, another decoy
is sent but with half the number of features that existed between the first and the second














f(x)dx, if c > µ
(5.13)
In the proposed system, the authentication process could be adapted to the number
of decoys, and which features to use. In a non-adaptive solution, the server compares the
accumulative probability with a precalculated threshold. In the adaptive solution, the system
depends on the frequency of sent decoys, rather than their accumulative probability.
5.3 Simulations and Experiments
The authentication system is simulated in Matlab. Assumptions for the simulation are listed
below.
 The features for the tags are assumed to be independent of each other;
 All of the features are assumed to follow a Gaussian (normal) distribution;
 The selected decoys are uniformly distributed throughout the feature set;
 For all the features, all the reads during the enrollment phase are within 1 standard-
deviation of that feature’s mean; and
 Decoys in any of the experiments do not exceed 50% of the available features.
In order to test the system we developed, we started by experimenting without the
existence of decoys. After that we moved into testing the system with the existence of
decoys.
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5.3.1 Experiments without decoys
We first simulated the system, in which there are no decoys. We divided this experiment into
three sub-experiments. The first sub-experiment is the effect of the number of features on
the tag’s score and threshold. The next sub-experiment was to simulate the authentication
system when the correct data is retrieved from the server (for example, can we authenticate
tag i if its enrolled data was retrieved). And finally, we simulated the case in which the
wrong data is retrieved from the server (for example, does the authentication system returns
unauthentic if we retrieved tag j data and we want to authenticate tag i, where i 6= j.
5.3.1.1 Effect of the number of features
In this experiment, we vary the number of features. The results are shown in Table 5.1.
As Table 5.1 shows, no matter how many features we have, we can always authenticate
a tag. The results also show that having more features will result in more authenticity
confidence (the ratio between the tag’s threshold and score increases when the number of
features increase). For instance, if we have 2 features, the threshold will be 1.8947 times
greater than the score. On the other hand, the threshold will be 8.0213× 1042 times greater
than the score when 128 features are being used.
5.3.1.2 Authentication when correct data is retrieved from the server
In this experiment, we model the correct behavior of the authentication system. We generate
data for M tags, each of them has N features, and each of them was read R times during the
enrollment phase. In the experiment, we assume that M = 100, N = 64, and R = 100. The
simulation selects tags at random and for each of the tags it tries to authenticate it. The tag
is assumed to be authentic when its score is less than the threshold value calculated during
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Table 5.1: The affect of the number of features on the tag’s threshold and score
Number of Features Tag Threshold Tag Score Threshold/Score
2 0.4315 0.2275 1.8967
4 0.1573 0.0080 19.6625
8 0.0285 1.8288× 10−05 1.5584× 10003
16 7.1445× 10−04 4.1138× 10−09 1.7367× 10005
32 6.6531× 10−07 3.1823× 10−23 2.0907× 10016
64 1.7671× 10−13 2.3583× 10−38 7.4931× 10024
128 4.9488× 10−26 6.1696× 10−69 8.0213× 10042
256 4.1920× 10−51 1.1316× 10−145 3.7045× 10094
512 1.9599× 10−100 1.222× 10−302 1.6038× 10202
1024 5.4951× 10−202 0.0 ——–
Table 5.2: Simulation of authenticating 20 tags when correct data is retrieved from the server
Tag# Tag Threshold Tag Score Tag# Tag Threshold Tag Score
1 8.5009× 10−17 1.9334× 10−34 11 4.4131× 10−18 1.2669× 10−38
2 1.0815× 10−17 6.7660× 10−40 12 3.2853× 10−17 1.2683× 10−40
3 1.7627× 10−18 6.1977× 10−37 13 1.6499× 10−18 3.9920× 10−40
4 2.3009× 10−18 5.9758× 10−40 14 2.7262× 10−18 5.4441× 10−38
5 3.7615× 10−17 6.5763× 10−38 15 1.7537× 10−17 1.2832× 10−39
6 4.0801× 10−17 5.1705× 10−36 16 3.9561× 10−18 2.8603× 10−36
7 1.5178× 10−17 4.3137× 10−38 17 3.7821× 10−17 1.5061× 10−39
8 2.8605× 10−18 1.8108× 10−37 18 1.8532× 10−17 9.7054× 10−38
9 2.8426× 10−19 5.7277× 10−41 19 4.6523× 10−18 1.3258× 10−34
10 2.5225× 10−18 8.7400× 10−41 20 1.0544× 10−18 7.8258× 10−40
the enrollment phase. The results show that we can authenticate 100% of the selected tags.
Table 5.2 shows the results of the authentication process. The simulation chose to select
41 tags randomly out of the tag pool. Table 5.2 clearly shows that even though the same
number of features is being used for all the tags, having different distributions will greatly
affect each tag’s threshold and score. Due to the large amount of data, we chose to present
a subset of the data we have (the first 20 tags). The results show that for the test data, the
ratio between the threshold and score ranges between 1.8645× 1012 and 4.1020× 1025.
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5.3.1.3 Incorrect authentication
In the final experiment without decoys, we test the system assuming the incorrect enrollment
data was retrieved from the server. In other words, we are simulating a situation where an
error occurred to the key sent from the reader to the server resulting in retrieving data for
a tag different than the one being authenticated. As before, we are using 100 tags, each of
them was read 100 times, and each of them has 64 features. The simulation selects a subset
of the enrolled tags and it tests these tags with every other enrolled tag. The results should
be that none of the tests are positive (authentic).
The results show that all the tags chosen as test instances had unauthentic result when
compared with other tags. In other words, tag i was tested unauthentic when compared with
tag j, where i 6= j. Table 5.3 shows a subset of the results obtained. Table 5.3 displays the
results of three tags ,tag #25, tag #37, and tag#13, when compared with tags 1 through 10.
Compared to Table 5.2, we notice that when the correct data is retrieved from the server,
the tag’s threshold is higher than the generated score. On the other hand, when incorrect
data is retrieved from the server, the score will be higher than the threshold. The previous
behavior is what we seek with the proposed authentication system. The results we obtained
show that 100% of the tested tags have a negative (unauthentic) test result.
5.3.2 Experiments with decoys
In this section, we test the performance of the authentication system with decoys. In the
first test, we assume the presence of a non-compromised tag or a reader. The simulation
selects at random a set of tags to test and selects at random which of the features to be
replaced by decoys. After that, the presence of a compromised reader is tested.
The results of this section experiments are presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. In these
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Table 5.3: Tag authentication with incorrect data retrieved
Tag# Tag Threshold Tag #25 Score Tag #37 Score Tag #13 Score
1 2.4759× 10−18 0.2561 0.3364 0.9483
2 4.1933× 10−18 1.0000 0.0324 0.4241
3 2.6997× 10−18 0.7813 0.0451 0.7480
4 1.5664× 10−18 0.9983 0.8221 0.5295
5 8.1903× 10−18 0.0381 0.0937 0.2731
6 2.4278× 10−17 0.1286 0.1117 0.4834
7 5.7622× 10−17 0.4828 0.0238 0.0247
8 1.4781× 10−16 0.4846 0.5914 0.8220
9 1.4092× 10−19 0.2173 0.2042 0.4106
10 1.3847× 10−18 0.9482 0.8960 0.5971
tables, two new columns are introduced to determine if the reader is compromised or not; the
third and the fourth columns of each table. The third column titled probability of max
value, represents the probability a feature has a value that is within dmc distance of the
decoy, while the fourth feature titled probability of features, represents the probability a
feature has a value that is within dc distance from the decoy. If the reader is not compromised
then the value in the third column should be less than the value in the fourth column, while
if the reader is compromised, the value in the third column should be higher than the value
in the fourth column.
5.3.2.1 Authenticating tags in the presence of decoys and a normal reader
Unlike the previous experiments, in this experiment we include decoys. We test how the
system reacts to the presence of decoys. In the simulation we generated 100 tags, each of
which has 64 features. The simulation selected 69% of the tags to test. It also used 42% of
the available features as decoys.
The results show that the system can authenticate 100% of the tags. The threshold vs.
tag score results are shown in Table 5.4. Even though the number of features used are the
same in all the performed experiments, the threshold and the score results are higher than
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Table 5.4: Authenticating tags with the presence of decoys
Tag Threshold Tag Score Prob of max value Prob of feature
2.6519× 10−10 8.1889× 10−24 7.1169× 10−19 5.8706× 10−15
9.7449× 10−11 7.8574× 10−22 8.0913× 10−19 2.0819× 10−14
3.5566× 10−11 2.3426× 10−21 6.7517× 10−19 1.5234× 10−13
2.4727× 10−10 4.6838× 10−21 9.2259× 10−19 2.7768× 10−15
2.0763× 10−10 1.9147× 10−18 6.5602× 10−19 3.1434× 10−13
4.2520× 10−10 6.9613× 10−21 7.6760× 10−19 1.0021× 10−13
1.4210× 10−10 3.3384× 10−22 1.1411× 10−19 9.1995× 10−15
4.6365× 10−11 9.3059× 10−20 1.3375× 10−19 1.6410× 10−14
2.5691× 10−11 4.5402× 10−19 7.9476× 10−20 2.4478× 10−15
3.8282× 10−11 2.4190× 10−22 2.9991× 10−18 1.4461× 10−15
the ones in Table 5.2. The reason for that is because we are excluding decoys and only using
genuine features.
5.3.2.2 Authenticating tags in the presence of decoys and a compromised reader
In this experiment, we simulate the presence of a compromised reader. A compromised
reader sends back to the server a small distance between the feature read from the tag and
the mean value sent from the server. Because of the presence of decoys, the distance the
reader should send back should be abnormally large.
As before, the simulator was instructed to generate data for 100 tags, each of which
has 64 features. The simulator choose 7% of the tags to test. The simulator also chose
10 features and changed them to decoys, which are 2 standard deviations from each of the
features’ mean (the user will be asked to determine the distance between the feature mean
and the decoy in terms of standard deviation). The results showed that the server was able
to catch every attempt a compromised reader tries. 100% of the 7 attempts were caught and
a compromised reader alert was issued. The results are shown in Table 5.5. If you notice the
data in Table 5.5, it shows that the tag is authentic if the score and the threshold for each
of the tags are compared. But since we are using decoys, the last two columns of the table
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need to be compared before comparing the first two columns (threshold and score). Since
the reader is compromised, it sends small distances in an attempt to fool the system. These
small distances will lead to small cumulative probability that is shown in the last column of
Table 5.5. If the reader is not compromised, then the data in column 4 must be larger then
the data in column 3. But, as the experiment shows, the data in column 4 is less than the
data in column 3, which leads us to believe that the reader is compromised.
Table 5.5: Authenticating tags in the presence of decoys and a compromised reader
Tag Threshold Tag Score Prob of max Value Prob of feature
6.5991× 10−10 1.1028× 10−28 2.7019× 10−18 1.2841× 10−47
4.6687× 10−10 1.2691× 10−21 8.6397× 10−19 2.4215× 10−46
1.2713× 10−10 8.8701× 10−23 3.1241× 10−18 5.9741× 10−45
2.6211× 10−10 5.0280× 10−24 1.9485× 10−18 1.6536× 10−47
8.9660× 10−12 1.5748× 10−22 3.8511× 10−18 1.9575× 10−45
6.0950× 10−11 1.2868× 10−31 4.5505× 10−18 9.5575× 10−46
1.0448× 10−11 2.9443× 10−26 1.2095× 10−18 4.5280× 10−49
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary
In this work, a study of electromagnetic signals and the ability to distinguish among them
based on a specific set of chosen features is presented. RFID technology has been selected
as a representative of electronic devices with wireless communication capabilities. Using
the extracted features, we demonstrated that it is possible to identify the manufacturer of
a specific tag as well as the individual tag with high accuracy. To identify RFID tags, we
used classification techniques such as k-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM. Also, we used HMM
technique to build models that describe the tag’s identity. To determine the performance of
each of the techniques, metrics such as TPR, accuracy, and AUC were calculated.
To identify RFID tags using regular classification techniques, a methodology to extract
and select the features was introduced. After extracting the features from the tag’s trans-
mission, a subset of the features is selected to use as a training set for the classification
techniques. To select the features, we started by testing all features combinations to deter-
mine if a particular feature pattern reveals itself. Once all feature combinations have been
tested, we applied data correlation techniques to eliminate highly related features. Finally,
we ranked the features using Fisher scoring to indicate which of the features should be re-
moved if the feature set needs to be scaled down. The performed classification experiments
showed that we can identify tag’s manufacturer with almost 100% TPR and a 100% AUC.
The experiments also showed that we can identify individual tags with 90.2% TPR, 99.8%
accuracy, and 100% AUC if 1-NN is used.
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In addition to classic classification techniques, HMM was used to identify tags (both
manufacturer identification and individual tag identification). To use HMM, we extract a
stream of observations from the transmission of the RFID tag(s). The observations were
used in their raw format for the first experiment, while we processed them for the rest of the
experiments. By processing the time-voltage waveform, timing and power observations were
extracted. A combination of timing and power observations lead to the best performance if
they are weighted. The best performance provided us with a 97.00% TPR, 97.67% accuracy,
and 97.18% AUC. HMM has that advantage over classic classification techniques of being
portable due their small size. Also, HMM has the ability to generate identification decisions
very fast compared to classification techniques that degrade in performance when the data
set becomes large.
After proving that using the appropriate observations (or feature set) we can identify a
specific tag, we moved our attention to signal authentication problem. To authenticate RFID
tags (or transmitted signals in general), we devised a technique in which we used decoys. A
decoy is a feature value that could not possibly be generated by the tag we wish to authen-
ticate. The authentication system we developed has two stages of operations: enrollment
phase and verification phase. During enrollment, the tag (or signal) to be authenticated in
the future is queried multiple times. Each time, the feature vector is recorded and stored
for future use. After the enrollment is completed, the set of collected feature vectors is
processed to extract statistics for each of the features (such as: mean, standard deviation,
weight, etc.). When the authenticity of a tag (or signal) needs to be verified, a new feature
vector is extracted and compared with the feature vectors extracted during enrollment. Us-
ing the extracted statistics, we can determine if the new feature vector was generated by the
same tag (signal) that was used during enrollment.
One of the issues that we focused on is the possibility of having a compromised reader. A
compromised reader will attempt to trick the system into treating unauthentic tag (signal)
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as an authentic one. The decoys in the system are present to mitigate against such problems.
A simulation was devised to test if the proposed authentication system can in-fact au-
thenticate tags. Based on the simulation, the system can authenticate 100% of the tags
when the reader is not compromised. The system can also detect any compromised reader
in the system.
6.2 Contributions
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. Developed a methodology to determine the set of features from which we can identify
signals with high accuracy;
2. Identified features to identify passive UHF RFID tags;
3. Investigated k-NN, Parzen windows, and SVM and we were able to identify a tag’s
manufacturer with 100% TPR and AUC (manufacturer is equivalent to tag IC chip).
also, we were able to identify individual tags with 90.2% TPR, 99.8% accuracy, and
100% AUC when 1-NN is used;
4. Investigated the usability of hidden Markov model to identify signals; and we were able
to achieve a 97% TPR, 97.69% accuracy, and 97.18% AUC;
5. Created a probabilistic system that can authenticate signals based on the distribution
of the extracted signal features; and
6. Introduced the concept of decoys in the signal’s authentication system from which we




In the future, we would like to expand this work. One of the issues we ran into is the limited
size of the data we have. We would like to measure a larger set of RFID tags to provide a
more accurate statistics. Also, we would like to expand the data set in which we obtained
an accuracy of 97% using only timing features [4]; the advantages of using timing include
being easier to measure and more stable.
Regarding the feature set, we would like to investigate additional sets of features to
determine if better performance can be achieved. The problem of selecting decoys will also
be of future interest to us; instead of selecting the decoys at random, we would like to
determine a way to select which features to be replaced by decoys. Also, we would like to
experiment with the way a compromised reader sends its distance to the server. Instead
of sending a fixed distance, a compromised reader could change the distance based on the
current feature value.
Adaptive authentication system is another idea we would like to test. In adaptive au-
thentication system, the server will keep on monitoring the responses from the reader. The
server will terminate the authentication process if it had enough evidence that the reader is
compromised, which means that the server does not need to send all of the modified feature
vector to the reader to detect a compromised reader. Finally, instead of simulations to de-




Accuracy: The percentage of instance that were correctly classified into either positive or
negative;
Authentication: The process of confirming or denying that a claimed identity is correct by
comparing the credentials of user/object with those previously proven, stored, and associated
with the identity being claimed;
Classification: Set of methods from which an object is mapped to a cluster of similar
objects;
Confusion Matrix: A specialized matrix that allows visualization of the performance of a
classification algorithm;
Cross Validation: A technique for assessing how the results of a statistical analysis will
generalize to an independent data set;
Curse of Dimensionality: A phenomenon that happens when using more features for
classification results in a degradation of the classifier performance;
Energy Harvesting: A technique in which energy from the reader is gathered by the tag,
stored briefly and transmitted back to the reader;
False Negative: A count that describes the number of positive test samples that were
wrongly classified as negative;
False Positive: A count that describes the number of negative test samples that were
wrongly classified as positive;
False Positive Rate: The percentage of negative classes that are classified as positive to
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the total number of negative instances (FP + TN);
Feature Extraction: The process at which features that describe a certain object will be
extracted from the behavior of that object;
Feature Selection: The process at which a reduction in the number of features we have will
happen. Features that can accurately describe the object will be selected while redundant
features and unhelpful features will be eliminated;
Fingerprinting: The process of creating a unique key that can be used to accurately identify
and/or authenticate an object;
Gaussian Distribution: also known as Normal distribution, is a continues probability
distribution that has a bell-curve shaped probability density function, which is known as the
Gaussian function;
High Frequency (HF): Radio frequencies that are between 3 and 30 MHz, with a wave-
length that is between 10 to 100 meters;
Histogram: A graphical representation showing visual impression of the distribution of
data;
Identification: The process of discovering the true identity of an item from the entire
collection of similar items, which requires a one-to-many matching;
Radio Frequency (RF): A rate of oscillation in the range of about 3 kHz to 300 GHz,
which corresponds to the frequency of radio waves, and the alternating currents which carry
radio signals [65];
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve: A graphical plot of the TPR vs. the FPR,
for a binary classifier system as the discriminant threshold is varied;
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True Negative: A count that describes the number of negative test samples that were
correctly classified as negative;
True Positive: A count that describes the number of positive test samples that were
correctly classified as positive;
True Positive Rate: The percentage of positive instance that are classified as positive to
the actual number of positive instances (TP + FN); and
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF): Radio frequencies that are between 300 MHz and 3 GHz,
with a wavelength that is between 10 cm to 1 meter;
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Appendix A: Building Confusion Matrix Using HMM Results
indexSize = size(index);
confusionMatrix = zeros(indexSize(1), indexSize(1));
for i=1:indexSize(1)
for j=1:indexSize(2)
if (index(i,j) == i)
confusionMatrix(i,i) = confusionMatrix(i,i) + 1;
end
if (index(i,j) ~= i)
confusionMatrix(i, index(i,j)) = ...








for j = 1:confusionSize(2)
if(j~=i)










for j = 1:confusionSize(2)
for k = 1:confusionSize(2)
if(j~=i && k~=i)





TPR(i) = TP(i)/(TP(i) + FN(i));
accuracy(i) = (TP(i) + TN(i))/(TP(i) + TN(i) + FN(i) + FP(i));
end
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Appendix B: Plotting ROC Curves Using HMM Results
T = zeros(3,300);
Y = zeros(3,300);

















expandTo = max([x(2) y(2) z(2)]);




















plot(fpr{1}, tpr{1},’Color’, [0, 0, 0], ’LineWidth’, 1.0);
plot(fpr{2}, tpr{2}, ’Color’, [0, 0, 1], ’LineWidth’, 1.0);







Appendix C: Using Weights to combine HMM models’ results
%To generate the index array for confusion matrix calcaulations
for i=1:indexSize(1)
for j=1:indexSize(2)


















Appendix D: Calculate Threshold for the Authentication System





for i = 1:numTags
threshold(i) = 1;
for j = 1:numFeatures
distance = 10*dataStat(i,j,2);
minBound = dataStat(i,j,1) - distance;
maxBound = dataStat(i,j,1) + distance;
%To construct the pdf of the feature
count = 1;
step = dataStat(i,j,2)/10;
for k = minBound:step:maxBound
pdfValues(count) = pdf(’norm’, k, dataStat(i,j,1), ...
dataStat(i,j,2));
featurevalues(count) = k;
count = count + 1;
end
[ furthestDistance, readIndex ] = findFurthestDistance(i, j...
, data, dataStat);
for k = 1:length(featurevalues)
distanceArray(k) = abs(dataStat(i,j,1) - ...
featurevalues(k));
end
for k = 1:length(distanceArray)
closestDistance(k) = abs(furthestDistance - ...
distanceArray(k));
end
[closestValue, minIndex] = min(closestDistance);
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if(minIndex > length(featurevalues)/2)





bounds(2) = length(featurevalues)/2 + ...
(abs(minIndex - length(featurevalues)/2));
else
bounds(1) = minIndex - 1;




threshold(i) = threshold(i) * areaUnderPDF;
prob(i,j,:) = pdfValues;
values(i,j,:) = featurevalues;
end
end
end
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